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The American public’s fear of becoming a victim of terrorism significantly 
increased after 9/11 and remained elevated much longer than one might expect. This 
thesis explains how and why Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat bears little 
relation to the dangers Americans actually face. Several factors influenced that shift. 
First, the news media landscape changed dramatically due to structural factors such as 
increased competition for audience share among traditional news sources, cable news 
networks, and the Internet. Second, the Internet allowed terrorist organizations, especially 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates, to propagate threats and messages directly to the public. 
Third, popular culture, especially film and television drama, affected Americans’ 
stereotypical understanding of terrorism. Finally, politicians and members of the 
terrorism industry were incentivized after 9/11 to inflate concerns about the terrorism 
threat. These factors coalesced, reacting with innate human sociological and 
psychological characteristics, to create a prolonged collective psychosis. This thesis finds 
that future policies and research focusing on risk communication, counterterrorism 
economics, and intelligence transparency may be essential to breaking this collective 
psychosis cycle.  
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A common conception among the public in the United States (hereafter referred to 
as the American public) is that the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11) 
“changed everything” regarding the terrorist threat. While 9/11 was undoubtedly a 
horrific event of unprecedented scale, Americans’ experience with terrorism pre-dates 
those attacks, most notably exemplified by the Oklahoma City Bombing (OKC bombing) 
in 1995. Furthermore, no major terrorist attack has occurred in the United States since 
9/11. This thesis examines the post-9/11 shift of the public’s perception of the terrorist 
threat, seeking to understand how and why Americans’ perceptions of the terrorism threat 
changed. The major research question answered in this thesis is: how do Americans 
perceive the threat of terrorism, and, more importantly, why did Americans’ fear of 
terrorist attacks in the United States subside after the OKC bombing, but not after 9/11, at 
least not to the level one could logically expect given the number of incidents since then?  
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research question is significant because, as counterterrorism scholar 
Benjamin Freidman relates, “inflated fear creates a permissive environment for 
overreaction to terrorism. Security politics becomes a seller’s market where the public 
will overpay for counterterrorism policies.”1 Specifically, Americans have spent 
significant amounts of tax dollars, supported initiating two wars, and sacrificed their civil 
liberties in an effort to address their fears about terrorism.  
Regarding counterterrorism expenses, estimates are that, in the decade following 
9/11, more than one trillion dollars was spent on domestic homeland security.2 
Expenses increased significantly in comparison to pre-9/11 spending. For example, about 
                                                 
1 Benjamin H. Friedman, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,” in Terrorizing 
Ourselves: Why U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is Failing and How to Fix It, ed. Benjamin H. Friedman, Jim 
Harper, and Christopher A. Preble (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2010), 191. 
2 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland 
Security,” Homeland Security Affairs 7, no. 1 (2011): 2. 
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$12 billion was spent in 2000; 2009 expenses topped $66 billion.3 Furthermore, the 
Department of Homeland Security’s budget grew 45 percent, from $31 billion in 2003 to 
$55 billion in 2010.4 Moreover, the United States intelligence budget doubled to 
$70 billion per year between 2001 and 2013.5 
The majority of the American public also identified and supported the campaigns 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq as counterterrorism efforts.6 As a result of these wars, 
through 14 February 2013, the Department of Defense reported 6,656 American service 
members dead and another 50,476 wounded in action.7 Furthermore, contractor deaths 
are estimated between three and six thousand over the same period.8 The Department of 
Veteran’s Affairs also reported nearly 675,000 disability claims stemming from the two 
wars.9 Besides the human costs, Harvard University’s Linda Bilmes estimated in 2013 
                                                 
3 Friedman, “Managing Fear: The Politics of Homeland Security,” 191. 
4 Ibid. 
5 James Risen, Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War (New York: Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt Publishing Company, 2014), xv. 
6 “Afghanistan: Gallup Historical Trends,” Gallup, accessed 31 May 2017, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116233/afghanistan.aspx; Andrew Dugan, “Fewer in U.S. View Iraq, 
Afghanistan Wars as Mistakes,” Gallup, 12 June 2016, http://www.gallup.com/poll/183575/fewer-view-
iraq-afghanistan-wars-mistakes.aspx?g_source=IRAQ_WAR&g_medium=topic&g_campaign=tiles. 
Gallup polls from 2002, 2003 and 2004 showed that 55 percent, 50 percent, and 50 percent, respectively, of 
respondents identified the Iraq war as part of the War on Terrorism. A similar poll undertaken in 2007 
showed that 65 percent of respondents identified the war in Afghanistan as part of the War on Terrorism. 
Interestingly, Gallup did not have earlier data for Afghanistan. However, an October 2001 poll asking 
respondents to define the primary military mission in Afghanistan revealed 41 percent of respondents 
answering “Destroying terrorist operations” and another 25 percent answering “Capturing or killing bin 
Laden,” with only 29 percent answering “Removing the Taliban from power.” Regarding war support, in a 
January 2002 Gallup poll, 93 percent of Americans considered the military campaign in Afghanistan “Not a 
mistake”; in October 2004, 51 percent of Americans said the same for the war in Iraq. 
7 Catherine Lutz, “US and Coalition Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan” (working paper, Watson 
Institution for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, 21 February 2013), 1 & 4, 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/USandCoalition.pdf. 
8 Ibid., 1. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
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that the wars’ total costs will exceed $4 trillion, including operations, medical and 
disability, and social costs.10 
Finally, in response to fears about terrorism, a significant number of Americans 
have been willing to exchange civil liberties for security. Immediately after 9/11, 
47 percent of poll respondents said they supported the view that “the government should 
take all steps necessary to prevent additional acts of terrorism in the United States, even if 
it means your basic civil liberties would be violated.”11 A year after 9/11, about a third of 
Americans maintained the same opinion and continued to do so through 2015.12 As a 
reflection of this sentiment, the government passed the USA PATRIOT Act in October 
2001, passing in the Senate by a vote of 98 to 1, and by 357 to 66 in the House.13 The 
measure was extended in March 2006 and again in May 2011. Provisions included so-
called “sneak-and-peak” searches that allowed law enforcement to search private homes 
without notifying owners, “roving wiretaps” that allowed investigators to track suspects 
even if they changed phone numbers or service providers, “national security letters” that 
allowed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to demand confidential records of 
consumers from private firms, and extended detention or deportation of terror suspects 
without due process.14 Other policies included retaining indefinitely and even torturing 
“unlawful combatants” captured in Afghanistan and other regions.15 As late as June 
                                                 
10 Linda J. Bilmes, “The Financial Legacy of Iraq and Afghanistan: How Wartime Spending 
Decisions Will Constrain Future National Security Budgets” (Faculty Research Working Paper Series, 
Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Boston, MA, March 2013), 20, 
https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=8956&type=FN&PersonI
d=177); Neta C. Crawford, “US Budgetary Costs of War through 2016: $4.79 Trillion and Counting” 
(working paper, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence, RI, 
September 2016), 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War%20through%202016
%20FINAL%20final%20v2.pdf. Crawford supports Bilmes’ analysis: through 2016, war and homeland 
security costs have been $4.79 trillion. 
11 “Terrorism in the United States: Gallup Historical Trends.” 
12 Ibid.; polls show Sept 2002 at 33 percent and June 2015 at 30 percent. 
13 Joshua Woods, Freaking Out: A Decade of Living With Terrorism (Washington, DC: Potomac 
Books, 2012), 14. 
14 Ibid., 14–15. 
15 Ibid., 16. 
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2014, when asked whether the United States should or should not close the detention 
center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for these captives, 66 percent of American poll 
respondents declared that it should not be closed.16 Moreover, when asked if the Attorney 
General under President Barack Obama should investigate the George W. Bush 
administration’s use of torture against terrorism suspects, only 47 percent of Americans 
approved of the investigation.17 
Clearly, the costs for Americans’ reactions to terrorism are not inconsequential. 
As Benjamin Freidman, Jim Harper, and Christopher Preble put it, “overreaction does the 
work of terrorism.”18 Understanding what causes Americans to disproportionately fear 
the threat of terrorism will help develop strategies to help correct that imbalance. This 
thesis will add to the body of literature debating this topic, especially in regard to 
understanding Americans’ increased fear of terrorism despite the lack of a major attack in 
the United States since 9/11. 
B. THE PUBLIC’S PERCEPTION OF THE TERRORIST THREAT 
Evidence suggests that Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat changed 
significantly after 9/11.19 Sociologist Joshua Woods argues that, “one of the most 
powerful and long-lasting changes in the public mindset after 9/11 was the increase in the 
perceived threat of terrorism… After previous attacks in the United States, including the 
first assault on the World Trade Center in February 1993 and the Oklahoma City 
bombing in April 1995, the threat of terrorism captured the county’s attention, but did not 
become…a permanent concern for most Americans.”20 Numerous data support this 
                                                 
16 “ War on Terrorism: Gallup Historical Trends,” Gallup, accessed 20 May 2017, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Benjamin Friedman, Jim Harper, and Christopher A. Preble. Terrorizing Ourselves (see note 1), 1.  
19 Sociologist Joshua Woods uses the term “perceived threat” in regards to terrorism to describe the 
“deeply intertwined components” of emotional reactions, such as concern, worry or fear, and so-called 
cognitive reactions, or risk beliefs, to danger. See Joshua Woods, “The 9/11 Effect: Toward a Social 
Science of the Terrorist Threat,” The Social Science Journal 48 (2011), 214. 
20 Ibid., 214. 
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assertion. According to Gallup polls, immediately after Timothy McVeigh bombed the 
Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and killed 168 people on 19 April 
1995, 42 percent of poll respondents reported that they were very or somewhat worried 
about becoming a victim of terrorism.21 By 2000, the percentage had declined to 
24 percent. After the events of 9/11, when terrorists hijacked four commercial airliners, 
crashing them into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania field, 
killing 2,976 people, Gallup reported 59 percent of polled respondents being very or 
somewhat worried about becoming a victim of terrorism.22 By early 2002, the percentage 
dropped to 35 percent. Since then, the percentage oscillated between a high of 51 percent 
(reported in December 2015) and a low of 28 percent (reported in January 2004), though 
averaged between 35–40 percent through 2015 (see Figure 1).23 
Figure 1.  American Perceptions of the Terrorist Threat (1995–2015).24 
 
Question: How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim 
of terrorism—very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all? 
                                                 
21 “The Oklahoma City Bombing: 20 Years Later,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed 20 May 
2017, https://stories.fbi.gov/oklahoma-bombing/; “Terrorism in the United States: Gallup Historical 
Trends,” Gallup, accessed 20 May 2017, http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx. 
22 “Remembering 9/11: FBI Has Evolved in Response to Changing Threats,” Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 9 September 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/remembering-911. 
23 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “American Public Opinion on Terrorism Since 9/11: Trends 
and Puzzles” (paper prepared for presentation at the National Convention of the International Studies 
Association, Atlanta, GA, 8 March 2016, http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/tpoISA16.pdf), 5. 
24 Source: “Terrorism in the United States: Gallup Historical Trends,” Gallup, accessed 20 May 2017, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/4909/Terrorism-United-States.aspx. 
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Other data follows similar trends. For example, immediately after 9/11, 66 percent 
of polled Americans thought another attack was very or somewhat likely. As late as 2007, 
however, 40 percent of Americans continued to believe so.25 Fears peaked again after the 
death of Osama bin Laden, with polls in May 2011 showing that 62 percent “thought an 
act of terrorism was either somewhat or very likely in the next several weeks.”26 
Similarly, an average of about one third of Americans, from 2001 through 2014, thought 
that the United States was “less safe” compared to before 9/11, with peaks as high as 
42 percent thinking so in late 2006 and 2010.27 Finally, in response to Gallup’s long-
running open-ended poll about the most important problem facing the United States, 
immediately after 9/11, 46 percent of Americans listed terrorism. This concern slowly 
declined over the next decade, with eight percent citing terrorism in 2010. However, 
before 9/11, terrorism responses “barely registered” as a response at nearly zero percent, 
and, as of December 2015, terrorism was the most oft-cited concern at 16 percent.28 
Another indicator of Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat is reflected in 
their support of counterterrorism policies. For instance, Gallup polls found that in 
November 2001, 62 percent of Americans “advocated the start of a ‘long-term war’” 
against terrorism.29 Furthermore, one study found that 20 percent more Americans 
supported military action in response to 9/11 than the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania.30 Moreover, support for American military intervention was sustained by a 
large majority of Americans for years after 9/11. As late as 2007, 70 percent of 
Americans answered “no” when asked if military action in Afghanistan was “a 
                                                 
25 Woods, “The 9/11 Effect: Toward a Social Science of the Terrorist Threat,” 215. 
26 Woods, Freaking Out: A Decade of Living With Terrorism, 26. 
27 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Chasing Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 56. 
28 Rebecca Riffkin, “Americans Name Terrorism as No. 1 U.S. Problem,” Gallup, 14 December 2015, 
http://news.gallup.com/poll/187655/americans-name-terrorism-no-problem.aspx. Per the article’s title, 16 
percent of Americans in December 2015, the highest since 9/11, named terrorism as the top problem facing 
the United States. The next highest concerns were the government at 13 percent, the economy at nine 
percent, and guns at seven percent. 
29 Cited in Woods, “The 9/11 Effect: Toward a Social Science of the Terrorist Threat,” 220. 
30 Ibid. 
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mistake.”31 In regard to the American public’s “willingness to make the civil liberties 
tradeoff” to fight terrorism, polls show that, after the OKC bombing, 49 percent of 
Americans were willing to support tradeoffs immediately after the bombing but only 
29 percent were just two years later. After 9/11, 69 percent of the public were willing to 
support tradeoffs and, as late as July 2005, that percentage remained 11 points higher 
than pre-9/11 levels.32 
In sum, according to available polling data, Americans’ fear about the terrorist 
threat in the years after 9/11 increased significantly compared to after attacks in the 
1990s. Moreover, after the spike in concern about the terrorist threat immediately after 
9/11, Americans’ concerns remained elevated for an extended period whereas after 
the OKC bombing and other previous attacks Americans’ concerns eased more quickly 
and to lower levels. As Karlyn Bowman explains regarding public perceptions 
post-9/11, “today that threat is part of everyday life, and Americans expect another attack 
on our soil.”33 
C. ASSESSING CHANGES IN THE TERRORIST THREAT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Though Americans’ concerns about the terrorist threat have increased post-9/11, 
the actual scale and intensity of terrorism in the United States has not. That said, as Alex 
Schmid, a scholar who has focused extensively on sifting through the broad field of 
defining terrorism, argues, “terrorism is a contested concept.”34 As such, this thesis relies 
on the data and definitions from the well-known Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to 
meet this requirement. GTD defines a terrorist attack as: 
The threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state 
actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., 221. 
33 Karlyn Bowman, “U.S. Public Opinion and the Terrorist Threat,” One Issue, Two Voices 4 (October 
2005), 8, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/20060606_threats.pdf. 
34 Alex P. Schmid, “The Revised Academic Consensus Definition on Terrorism,” Perspectives on 
Terrorism 2, no. 6 (May 2012), 158. 
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coercion, or intimidation…In addition, at least two of the following three 
criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD: 
Criterion 1: The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal… 
Criteria 2: There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the 
immediate victims… 
Criteria 3: The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities.35  
In order to avoid as much ambiguity as possible, this thesis also focuses solely on 
incidents and deaths from attacks occurring within the United States between 1991 and 
2011.36 Geographically, this decision excludes overseas attacks that could be argued as 
terrorism, insurgency, or even warfare; chronologically, this 20-year period not only 
provides a large enough time period so trends become visible, it also crosses multiple 
presidential administrations, includes the two largest-ever terrorist attacks on United 
States soil, and is bookended by the end of the Cold War and the rise of the Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), both topics which deserve their own focus beyond the scope of 
this thesis.37 
                                                 
35 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global 
Terrorism Database (Codebook: Inclusion Criteria and Variables; June 2017), 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd, 9. 
36 GTD counts 798 terrorist attacks on Americans and 991 American deaths due to terrorism globally 
(United States excluded) between 1991–2011. This is an average of nearly 40 attacks and 50 deaths per 
year. Notably, 235 of those deaths happened during the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. 
Also, 112 attacks and 441 of those deaths happened in either Iraq or Afghanistan after 9/11. This thesis also 
reports only the number of people killed in a terrorist incident and not injuries or structure damage. The 
biggest issue precluding an analysis of injuries and structure damage is that of degree. The GTD counts 
injuries in aggregate per attack without discerning among the severity of injuries. As a result, injury counts 
do not accurately reflect the comparative scale of terrorist incidents. Likewise, the GTD’s limited 
categories for estimating property damage are wide, thus creating the potential for extensive variability 
when aggregating damage estimates. Additionally, although passport circulation increased steadily from 11 
million in 1990 to 101 million in 2010, fewer than one third of Americans in 2010 possessed, let alone 
used, passports. Therefore, exposure to terrorism overseas for most Americans was, and continues to be, a 
limited issue. “Passport Statistics: Valid Passports in Circulation (1986-2016),” U.S. Department of State: 
Bureau of Consular Affairs, accessed October 26, 2017, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics.html. 
37 “The Collapse of the Soviet Union,” Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed 13 July 
2017, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/collapse-soviet-union; “Mapping Militant 
Organizations,” Stanford University, 14 April 2017, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/1.  
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Data from the GTD supports the premise that the scale and intensity of attacks 
pre-9/11 is not less than post-9/11.38 First, in terms of the quantity of terrorist attacks, 
terrorist attacks were actually more prevalent before 9/11 than afterwards. According to 
GTD data, there were 573 terrorist attacks in the United States from 1991–2011, with 
389 occurring before 9/11 and 180 occurring afterward (see Figure 2).39 On average, 
there were slightly more than 39 attacks per year before 9/11 compared to nearly 18 per 
year after 9/11. In other words, in the decade before 9/11, there were nearly twice as 
many terrorist attacks in the United States than in the decade after 9/11. 
Figure 2.  Terrorist Attacks per Year in the United States (1991–2011).40 
 
                                                 
38 The GTD suffered a technical database error resulting in incomplete data for 1993. As such, this 
thesis omits the year 1993 when analyzing GTD data (including in average calculations). However, 
according to terrorism scholar Christopher Hewitt, there were 43 terrorist and political violence incidents 
and 113 associated deaths in 1993 (count includes the April 19, 1993 Waco, Texas shootout at the Branch 
Davidian compound where 92 people died during a federal law enforcement raid). Of those, perhaps five 
incidents and 101 deaths (including the Waco, Texas shootout) are questionably associated with terrorism 
proper as defined above. As such, 1993 does not appear to be an outlier year in terms of terrorism during 
the 1990s. Christopher Hewitt, Political Violence and Terrorism in Modern America: A Chronology 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2005), 161–163. 
39 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global 
Terrorism Database (globalterrorismdb_0617dist.xlsx; June 2017), https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. The 
GTD includes both successful and failed attacks, but not foiled plots; see discussion below regarding 
accounting for foiled plots. Also, the GTD counts 9/11 as four separate terrorist incidents—one for each 
hijacked airliner. The GTD also counts 78 “Doubt Terrorism” cases before 9/11, 35 cases after 9/11, and 
lists 43 “Not Coded” cases (all before 1997) from 1991–2011. Even eliminating all “Doubt Terrorism” and 
“Not Coded” cases from calculations, the number of pre-9/11 attacks exceeds post-9/11 attacks by nearly 
two-to-one. 
40 Adapted from: Ibid. 
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Second, the GTD data reveals 9/11 as an outlier in terms of the number of deaths 
due to terrorism. There were 211 terrorism-related deaths before 9/11. After 9/11, not 
including 9/11 itself, there were 36 terrorism-related deaths (see Figure 3).41 On average, 
there were more than six times the number of terrorist-related deaths per year in the 
United States pre-9/11 than post-9/11.42 
Figure 3.  Terrorist-Related Deaths per Year in the United States (1991–2011).43 
 
 
Of course, some scholars, such as Martha Crenshaw, Erik Dahl, and Margaret 
Wilson, have noted that the GTD data may only represent the “tip of the iceberg” leading 
                                                 
41 Ibid. The GTD attributes 2,998 deaths to 9/11. In addition, the GTD reports 24 “Doubt Terrorism” 
deaths and five “Not Coded” deaths before 9/11. Post-9/11, the GTD reports two “Doubt Terrorism” 
deaths. Eliminating all “Doubt Terrorism” and “Not Coded” cases from calculations, the average number of 
terrorism-related deaths pre-9/11 outpaces post-9/11 deaths by a factor of more than five. 
42 Notably, excluding both the OKC bombing and 9/11 as outliers, terrorism-related deaths have 
remained nearly constant over the 20-year period at approximately four per year. Including both events, the 
average number of deaths is just over 162 per year. For a point of comparison, there were an average of 
12,757 gun-violence homicides per year in the United States from 1993–2011. See Michael Planty and 
Jennifer L. Truman, “Firearm Violence, 1993–2011,” Bureau of Justice Statistics (May 2013): 2, 
NCJ241730, https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fv9311.pdf. Moreover, there were an average 43,396 
motor vehicle-related deaths per year between 1999–2015. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting 
System (WISQARS); Accessed 16 July 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/fatal.html. 
43 Adapted from: Ibid. 
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to “an incomplete understanding of terrorism and its consequences.”44 Rightly so, they 
logically insist that public concern about terrorism should only be judged while balancing 
consideration for failed and foiled plots with successful ones.45 Indeed, some counts 
appear to support this argument. According to Dahl’s personal tally, there were 
133 domestic failed or foiled plots of terrorism in the United States between 1993 and 
2011.46 This averages to nearly two and a half more unsuccessful plots per year post-9/11 
than pre-9/11 (see Figure 4). However, this thesis argues that considering this information 
in relation to public opinion is premature: first, it is arguable whether or not the public is 
fully aware of these foiled plots and failed attacks; and second, as Crenshaw and 
associates admit, many of these post-9/11 incidents involve “individuals who do not 
appear to represent a significant threat, and whose commitment and abilities are 
questionable.”47 In other words, the government may simply be casting a wider net, or as 
John Mueller and Mark Stewart suggest, even manufacturing cases to justify 
counterterrorism budgets: “one approach to the problem of the near-dearth of domestic 
terrorists is to create them…and the police seem to be getting better at this enterprise.”48 
                                                 
44 Martha Crenshaw, Erik Dahl, and Margaret Wilson, “Beneath the Tip of the Iceberg: A New Data 
Set of Failed and Foiled Terrorist Plots” (Preliminary draft as of February 2017 for presentation at the 
International Studies Association Annual Conference, Baltimore, MD, 2017), 2. 
45 Ibid., 2. As mentioned, GTD includes failed (e.g., an explosive device did not detonate as intended) 
but not foiled (e.g., prevented by law enforcement) plots. 
46 Erik Dahl, email message to author, 11 July 2017. Dr. Dahl provided, and granted permission to 
cite, a working database he uses to “track unsuccessful plots and attacks against American targets, both in 
the U.S. and overseas, and from both radical Islamist and from other sources…” The database is an 
extension of an earlier version published in Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack (Georgetown University 
Press, 2013). 
47 Crenshaw, Dahl, and Wilson, “Beneath the Tip of the Iceberg: A New Data Set of Failed and Foiled 
Terrorist Plots,” 20. 
48 Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, 30. The authors note that of the 62 Islamic extremist 
terrorism cases in the United States since 9/11 that they list, more than half are noted to have been crucially 
dependent on informants or operatives for their development. Mueller and Stewart also list eight cases that, 
without the help of an insider operative, would have disintegrated completely. Moreover, they note that the 
FBI “maintains some 15,000 official informants—ten times the number it had during the 1970s,” some of 
whom have been incentivized more than $100,000 to garner terrorism-related convictions. See pages 31, 
267–274. 
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Figure 4.  Total Failed or Foiled Terrorism Plots in the United States (1993–2011).49 
 
 
In sum, in contrast to the public’s concern otherwise, this thesis argues that 9/11 
does not appear to be an harbinger of any significant increase in the number of deaths 
caused by terrorism in the United States post-9/11 compared to pre-9/11. Given the 
20-year snapshot presented above, 9/11 appears, thankfully, to be an outlier event in 
regard to the scale and intensity of the terrorist threat.50 Thus, comparing pre and post-
9/11, Americans’ elevated and sustained fear of the terrorist threat post-9/11 does not 
appear to be based on an objective measurement of the scale and intensity of terrorist 
attacks in the United States. The remainder of this thesis seeks to identify the factors that 
might have contributed to this condition.  
                                                 
49 Adapted from: Erik Dahl, email message to author, 11 July 2017. The database is an extension of an 
earlier version published in Dahl, Intelligence and Surprise Attack (Georgetown University Press, 2013). 
50 Not addressed in this thesis is the scholarly debate about the extent of so-called “new terrorism.” 
Advocates for new terrorism argue that, starting in the 1990s, a marked difference developed between old 
and new terrorists, exemplified by the rise of groups such as Al Qaeda. These new terrorist groups are 
characterized by their conduct of ad hoc network structure, transnational operations, religious and 
apocalyptic fanaticism (including millenarianism), and indiscriminate and excessive use of violence, 
especially by means of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). See Martha Crenshaw, “The Debate Over 
“New” vs. “Old” Terrorism,” (Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 30 August-2 September, 2007, accessed 7 June 2017 at 
http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/New_vs_Old_Terrorism.pdf) and Isabelle 
Duyvesteyn, “How New Is the New Terrorism?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, no. 27 (2004): 439–454, 
doi: 10.1080/10576100490483750 for the arguments refuting any increase in the likelihood of an 









D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
A survey of the terrorism-specific literature reveals that explanations for the pre 
and post-9/11 shift in Americans’ perceptions of the terrorism threat involve a complex 
interaction of psychological, sociological, technological, political, and economic factors. 
This thesis has categorized those generally as revolving around the news media, popular 
culture, the Internet, political elites and other members of the so-called “terrorism 
industry.” This section summarizes those arguments. 
1. The News Media 
Several works discuss the link between the news media landscape and Americans’ 
perception of terrorism. In Shock of the News, Brian Monahan underscores the media’s 
shift towards news stories that are dramatic and emotional—what Monahan calls “public 
drama.”51 Changing economic, technological, and cultural foundations are blamed for the 
shifts. First, Monahan notes that the accelerating transition to a for-profit model at the 
turn of the century directly impacted what kinds of content were considered news-
worthy.52 Second, the advent of 24-hour news channels and the Internet created more 
competition, access to information and images from around the globe, and the need to fill 
“news holes” with more content and coverage.53 As a result, the “media logic” has 
shifted, blending hard and soft news with “emphasis on creating news that is an attractive 
product rather than a vehicle for public enrichment and substantive discourse.”54 The 
side-effect is that news as public drama shapes viewers’ world views through 
oversimplified, single narratives that lack alternative points of view.55 
                                                 
51 Brian A. Monahan, The Shock of the News: Media Coverage and the Making of 9/11 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2010), 18. 
52 Ibid., 23–24. 
53 Ibid., 24. 
54 Ibid., 26. 
55 Ibid., 27; Monahan gives the example of 9/11 as “a melodramatic morality tale built on the struggle 
between good and evil and populated with villains, heroes, and victims.” 
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Moreover, Joshua Woods, in his book Freaking Out, argues that the vast majority 
of Americans only experience terrorism indirectly through the media. Therefore, how the 
news media frames the terrorist threat especially affects public perceptions of the terrorist 
threat.56 By using the frames of “terrorism,” “radical Islamic,” and “nuclear,” the post-
9/11 media activates a “preconceived set of ideas” that elevate threat perception because 
of their unfamiliarity, uncontrollability, and catastrophic potential.57 Woods further 
contends that, because of the highly competitive capitalist system our media is subject to, 
the media has an incentive to operate within these fear-inducing frames that entice 
viewership.58 Moreover, in matters of national security, Woods notes that top public 
officials are well positioned to set the national agenda, projecting that agenda through the 
media. Those officials are likewise incentivized to cultivate fear in order to “sell 
themselves as saviors.”59 
Additionally, Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Shapiro, present one 
of the most comprehensive and representative works on the subject. In Selling Fear, the 
authors suggest that the news media failed to uphold their “watchdog” role to present 
independent critique and analysis of the government.60 For a multitude of reasons, 
including a post-crisis rally-around-the-flag effect, market forces shifting hard news to 
“infotainment,” and indexing or propaganda effects that make the news inherently 
vulnerable to government “news management” in times of crisis, the news media 
                                                 
56 Woods, Freaking Out: A Decade of Living With Terrorism, 65. 
57 Ibid., 67–69. 
58 Ibid., 131. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Brigitte L. Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro, Selling Fear: Counterterrorism, the 
Media, and Public Opinion (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2011), xii. 
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deferred to the government post-9/11 to set the public agenda.61 As a result, the Bush 
administration was able to amplify and sustain Americans’ elevated perception of the 
threat of transnational terrorism and pursue its policies virtually uncontested.62 
Furthermore, Nacos and her associates present evidence that the media’s coverage of 
specific threats made by terrorists, such as by Osama bin Laden, and the government 
raising the terrorist threat alert levels, directly correlated to increases in public 
perceptions of the terrorist threat.63 
2. Popular Culture 
In addition to the news shaping Americans’ world views, some research suggests 
that popular culture, especially film and television drama, is also an important source of 
information affecting public perceptions. Nacos, in Mass-Mediated Terrorism, provides a 
review of the relevant works, noting “Hollywood productions cannot be separated from 
the political realities of particular times.”64 In other words, the contemporary discourse 
on terrorism cannot be understood without also understanding how it is portrayed in 
movies and television. Moreover, Nacos relates that popular culture can act like “adult 
education,” linking viewers’ perceptions of reality with movie and television content.65 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 7–13, 183. See pages 7–8 for a discussion of “rally-around-the-flag” effects in the news media 
context: “rallies occur when the news reflects that opinion leaders (administration officials, members of 
Congress, and others) either support the president or abstain from criticism…In the immediate aftermath of 
the 9/11 strikes, the news reflected a broad consensus on the need to suspend bipartisanship for the benefit 
of a united front…” See pages 8–9 for a discussion of the market forces shifting the media from hard news 
to infotainment. See pages 12–13 for a discussion of indexing and propaganda effects: “‘indexing’ speaks 
to the media’s tendency to make news decisions based on their assessments of the power dynamics inside 
government…By relying mostly or solely on the most influential governmental insiders, the media allow 
them and their institutions to frame the news, set the range of the mass-mediated debate, and influence the 
politics of policymaking and the policies themselves;” the “propaganda or hegemony model considers the 
mainstream media as an instrument of America’s power elite who include the top echelon of the economic, 
military, and political domains…’the media serve, and propagandize on behalf of the powerful societal 
interests that control and finance them.’”  
62 Ibid., 196. 
63 Ibid., 54–55. 
64 Brigitte Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, Third Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2016), Kindle 
edition, loc 3813. 
65 Ibid., loc 3840. 
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This blurring of news and popular culture is especially salient when news outlets splice 
movie or television content into their broadcasts in order to provide dramatic visuals for a 
story.66 Nacos further posits that popular culture, whether done intentionally or not, may 
propagate political agendas, such as public officials frequently citing Jack Bauer’s 
successful use of torture to disrupt terrorist plots in the television show 24.67 Finally, 
supporting Nacos’ review, Ian Lustick provides a useful list of terrorist-related films, 
novels, and television post-9/11, arguing that they both reflected Americans’ perceptions 
of the threat and sustained it by affecting Americans’ perceptions of reality.68 
3. The Internet 
The role the Internet plays in shaping Americans’ fears about the terrorist threat is 
another burgeoning area of research. Martin Rudner focuses on exactly how terrorist 
groups, such as Al Qaeda, have used the Internet as part of a strategy to wage “electronic 
jihad.”69 Actions like publishing speeches of terrorist leaders, inciting violence, urging 
support for affiliated terrorist groups, disseminating propaganda, glorifying martyrs, 
threatening targeted communities or individuals, distributing tactical training materials, 
webcasting “news reports,” and even publishing online magazines are all enabled by the 
Internet.70 The result is that the Internet has become a “powerful catalyst for facilitating 
Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorist activities and operations…[and has] created a threat 
environment wherein terrorist activities can emanate from a large number of countries 
                                                 
66 Ibid., loc 3868. 
67 Ibid., loc 3925–3948. 
68 Ian S. Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006), 24–27; Lustick’s informal survey covering 2001–2005 identified at least seven blockbuster movies 
released with terrorism-related plots: Collateral Damage, The Sum of All Fears, Face of Terror, Antibody, 
American Heroes, When Eagles Strike, and Blast!; a sample of an airport bookstore in 2005 showed 20 
percent of paperback novels were terrorism-related, including Splinter Cell, State of Fear, Deception Point, 
London Bridges, and The Lazarus Vendetta; made-for-television movies from 2001–2005 included Winds 
of Terror, Operation Wolverine: Seconds to Spare, The President’s Man 2: A Line in the Sand, Smallpox 
2002: Silent Weapon, The Pilot’s Wife, Counterstrike, Critical Assembly, Tiger Cruise, and the highly 
popular docudrama Dirty War; television shows dedicated to terrorism-related topics included The Agency, 
NCIS, Threat Matrix, Alias, a mini-series called Sleeper Cell, and, of course, 24.  
69 Martin Rudner, “Electronic Jihad: The Internet as Al Qaeda’s Catalyst for Global Terror,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 1 (February 2017): 11, doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1157403. 
70 Ibid., 12. 
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and elements within countries.”71 In other words, the Internet diffuses the jihadist threat 
across the globe, inspiring and linking otherwise disparate violent extremists.72 
Similarly, Gabriel Weimann’s post-9/11 seminal work on the subject highlights 
the advantages the Internet poses for terrorists. Easy and cheap access, lack of censorship 
or government control, access to huge audiences, anonymity, rapid dissemination of 
information, the ability to post multimedia content, and the capacity to affect traditional 
mass media all make the Internet an “ideal arena” for terrorists.73 Furthermore, terrorists 
use the Internet to target current and potential supporters, international public opinion, 
including journalists, and enemy publics. The latter target, enemy publics, is especially 
relevant as terrorists use the Internet to demoralize targeted citizens by threatening 
attacks as well as alter public opinion and spur lack of support for the government.74 
Among the terrorist uses of the Internet Weimann identifies, psychological warfare and 
publicity are the most pertinent to this thesis.75 According to Weimann, terrorists “use the 
Internet to spread disinformation, to deliver threats intended to distill fear and 
helplessness, and to disseminate horrific images of recent actions.”76 Likewise, “the 
Internet has significantly expanded the opportunities for terrorists to secure publicity.”77 
Terrorists no longer have to overcome news media “selection thresholds” and can instead 
control their own content.78 
Weimann’s more recent effort focuses on terrorists’ successful incorporation of 
social media into their communication strategies. Weimann notes that social media 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 14. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Gabriel Weimann, www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace, March 2004, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr116.pdf), 3. 
74 Ibid., 4–5. 
75 Ibid., 5–10; Weimann’s analysis fully explores psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, 
data mining, fundraising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, sharing information, and planning and 
coordination as post-9/11 terrorist uses of the Internet. 
76 Ibid., 5. 
77 Ibid., 6. 
78 Ibid. 
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differs from other communications methods in regard to its interactivity, reach, 
frequency, usability, immediacy, and permanence.79 Moreover, “with social media, 
information consumers also act as communicators, vastly expanding the number of 
information transmitters in the communication market.”80 Furthermore, terrorists use 
social media because their intended audience does and it “allows terrorist organizations to 
be part of the mainstream.”81 Social networks, in addition to being user friendly and free 
to use, allow terrorists to actively initiate engagement with target audiences, as opposed 
to traditional websites that depended on visitors coming to them of their own accord.82 
Finally, Nacos suggests that the Internet initially served as another platform for 
posting terrorist propaganda as a form of “mass self-communication” that eroded the role 
of traditional media gatekeepers, but that most people received news from television, 
newspapers, and magazines.83 However, Internet use has become much more ubiquitous 
in the last decade, and groups like the Islamic State (ISIS) have mastered a 
communications strategy that takes advantage of all features of the Internet, especially 
social media, thus amplifying terrorists’ abilities to mass self-communicate.84 Moreover, 
though the Internet makes more information available from more numerous sources, 
people “do not necessarily survey the diversity of information and opinions available in 
the marketplace of ideas but rely solely or mostly on those sources that fit their own 
views…the result is a widening of the perceived ‘us’ versus ‘them’ divide.”85 
                                                 
79 Gabriel Weimann, New Terrorism and New Media (Washington, DC: Commons Lab of the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2014, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/newterrorism-and-new-media), 4. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid., 5. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: Mainstream and Digital Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism, Third Edition, loc 1584. 
84 Ibid., loc 249, 1639, 1784. 
85 Ibid., loc 296. 
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4. The Political Elite 
Turning to the role of political elites’ incentives in changing Americans’ 
perceptions about the threat of terrorism post-9/11, the character of arguments ranges 
from conspiratorial to institutional. From the conspiratorial perspective, Lustick suggests 
“identifying the ruthless and calculated manipulation of post-9/11 anxieties that set off 
the spiral toward an extravagant and self-destructive War on Terror.”86 To this end, 
Lustick defines a set of “leading conservative Republican politicians with 
neoconservative activists, intellectuals, and journalists” as members of a cabal.87 The 
cabal’s aim was to establish American hegemony internationally and “conservative 
ascendency” domestically.88 Lustick suggests the cabal manipulated Americans’ 
anxieties post-9/11 to galvanize support for the “War on Terror,” specifically focused on 
the invasion of Iraq, for ideological and political reasons.89 More defensible, however, is 
Lustick’s assertion that the War on Terror then “took on a life of its own,” perpetuating 
itself beyond the control of any group or individuals—the public demanded more security 
and counterterrorism programs, companies, lobbyists, and politicians “identified the War 
on Terror as a key element in their own success.”90 
From an institutional standpoint, John Mueller suggests that politicians are 
incentivized to propagate fears about the terrorist threat in order to secure constituent 
support. For instance, President George W. Bush’s approval ratings hit record highs 
immediately following 9/11 and saw bumps each time the Department of Homeland 
Security elevated the country’s terrorism alert levels.91 In addition, Mueller suggests 
politicians exaggerate terrorism threats at the expense of realistic assessments in order not 
                                                 
86 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 6. 
87 Ibid., 49. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid., 70–71. 
90 Ibid., 71. 
91 John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security 
Threats, and Why We Believe Them (New York: Free Press, 2006), 33. 
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to be labeled “soft on terrorism” during election bids.92 This argument reflects Risen’s 
assertion that “American leaders have learned that keeping the terrorist threat alive 
provides enormous political benefits. It lets incumbents look tough, and lends them the 
national attention and political glamor that comes from dealing with national security 
issues.”93 Finally, Mueller argues that, given the significant increases in counterterrorism 
and homeland security expenditures, politicians from all levels are incentivized to hike 
the terrorism threat in order to justify pork-barrel spending projects.94 
Friedman likewise supports an institutional approach to explaining politicians’ 
behavior regarding the terrorist threat, though describes the incentive as a means to 
garner support for particular policy agendas. First, Freidman argues that, because “people 
see threats as more legitimate justifications for policies than ideological ends,” politicians 
are incentivized to justify foreign policy commitments under the guise of security.95 
Thus, “the search for enemies is constant.”96 Second, Friedman contends that stoking a 
sense of crisis overcomes so-called policy “veto players” that may be needed to support a 
politician’s policy changes.97 Policy makers can alarm veto players into supporting their 
policy changes or rouse the public to demand change. Thus, “policymakers, including the 
president, both generate and employ fear to make policy.”98 
5. The “Terrorism Industry” 
Terrorism scholars have also studied how members of the “terrorism industry,” 
such as bureaucratic organizations and other so-called “risk entrepreneurs,” are 
compelled to participate in increasing the public’s perceptions of the terrorist threat.99 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 34. 
93 Risen, Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War, 225. 
94 Mueller, Overblown, 35–36. 




99 John Mueller, “Inflating Terrorism,” in American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat 
Inflation Since 9/11, ed. A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer (New York: Routledge, 2009), 199. 
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Mueller’s works, Overblown and Chasing Ghosts, are representative of this perspective. 
First, Mueller argues that threat analysts and bureaucrats leading intelligence 
organizations suffer from a “9/11 Commission Syndrome” which spurred an “obsession 
with the career dangers in failing to ‘connect the dots.’”100 As a result, “threats, 
fabrications, half-truths [and] vague warning” all were documented, assessed, and even 
briefed to the level of the president post-9/11.101 Second, Mueller argues that 
undisciplined spending for homeland security measures created financial incentives to 
sustain public fears about terrorism for industry and government organizations alike that 
“would be out of business if terrorism were to be back-burnered.”102  
Lustick supports these arguments in Trapped in the War on Terror. He suggests 
that, in response to Americans’ perceptions about being “threatened with highly potent 
terrorist pathogens that pose deadly but essentially unpredictable threats,” government 
officials are pressured to respond in the most conservative manner, thus initiating or 
sustaining a positive feedback loop.103 Lustick labels this the “cover your ass” 
mechanism, wherein fear of being blamed after an attack drives threat inflation. He 
applies the mechanism to the intelligence community, military, and law enforcement.104 
Moreover, Lustick outlines how the War on Terror enhanced bureaucratic interests to 
align government agencies’ missions with counterterrorism in order to “increase or 
protect budget allocations.”105 Lustick extends the argument, showing that even 
organizations as disparate as the Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges 
and the National District Attorneys Association “sought to use counterterrorism to 
advance their own particular interests or pet projects.”106 In other words, the scope of 
                                                 
100 Mueller and Stewart, Chasing Ghosts, 19. 
101 Phillip Mudd, quoted in Ibid., 19. 
102 Mueller, Overblown, 41. 
103 Lustick, Trapped in the War on Terror, 89. 
104 Ibid., 89–90. 
105 Ibid., 86. 
106 Ibid., 79–80. 
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agencies and organizations supposedly involved with counterterrorism served to expand 
the public’s perception of the scope of the terrorist threat. 
Regarding organizational incentives, Friedman explains that “threats fade, but the 
organizations that combat them remain, making today’s fear tomorrow’s.”107 Stated 
another way, once created, public organizations seek to execute and sustain their mission. 
Freidman argues that this is so because the hierarchy created within organizations is 
conservative in nature and views changes to the mission as threatening. Furthermore, 
organization members become “infused” with the organization’s values, “making them 
servants of the organization’s mission.” Also, the organization’s “way of doing business” 
tends to provide impetus to garner outside support, such as funding.108 Accordingly, 
organizations with counterterrorism missions have an interest in “preserving the sense of 
threat that justified [the mission].”109 Freidman notes that this effect is especially 
noteworthy because the Bush administration defined counterterrorism as a military 
mission. Thus, the Department of Defense, one of the largest and most well-respected 
government agencies, tends to frame its operations and budgetary needs in relation to 
counterterrorism efforts. He also extends the concept to academic institutions and think 
tanks receiving homeland security and defense funds that then propagate reports, articles, 
and books that justify their terrorism focus.110 
Finally, another consideration regarding institutional incentives is the concept of 
the politicization of intelligence. Lowenthal describes politicization as the effect of 
analysts or intelligence officers injecting their preference for a certain policy outcome 
into their intelligence analysis.111 Politicization can be either positive or negative. 
Positive politicization is when intelligence is intentionally altered in order to support 
                                                 
107 Friedman, “Managing Fear,” 198. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid., 200–201. 
111 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Seventh Edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
2017), Kindle edition, loc 339. 
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outcomes preferred by policy makers.112 Lowenthal suggests motives for this type of 
politicization include “loss of objectivity regarding the issue at hand, a preference for 
specific options or outcomes, an effort to be more supportive, career interests, or outright 
pandering.”113 Negative politicization is when intelligence is produced to influence 
policy makers to change their policies.114 Though Lowenthal acknowledges that 
measuring intelligence politicization is difficult, he does recognize that the stakes are 
significant for intelligence analysts whose careers “can rise or fall…as a result of which 
side of a debate they are on.”115 
6. Sociological and Psychological Response  
The literature further suggests that 9/11 marked a turning point that 
“fundamentally changed the way Americans see the world.”116 Woods reviews some of 
these significant so-called “9/11 effects.” First, in the first few months after 9/11, 
Americans across the country suffered short-term “severe psychological distress” as 
represented by the 45 percent of adults and 35 percent of children in a nationwide survey 
reporting substantial symptoms of stress due to 9/11.117 In response to this national 
distress after 9/11, Americans “rallied around the flag” in support of the president, 
demonstrating increased levels of public trust in government and more patriotism. 
Americans also reported increased social and political engagement and greater interest in 
the news.118 Furthermore, Americans appeared more willing to “punish those who violate 
conventional values” and support “leaders who displayed power, toughness, and an iron 
determination to confront the enemy.”119 According to Woods, these factors, stoked by 
                                                 
112 Ibid., loc 4388. 
113 Ibid., loc 4388. 
114 Ibid. 
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the media’s so-called “dominant symbolic repertoire,” then “harmonized with the 
government’s aggressive foreign and domestic policies” to sustain American’s fear of 
terrorism and subsequent support for counterterrorism policies beyond the initial 
psychological shock of the attacks.120 
In addition to the shock effects of 9/11, Friedman also claims that, “Americans 
want more homeland security than they need” because “cognitive biases cause people to 
worry more about terrorists than they should.”121 In short, people use “mental shortcuts 
based on impressions,” or heuristics, to assess danger, resulting in inaccurate estimates 
about the actual risk to life posed by terrorists.122 For instance, people tend to focus on 
high-consequence events despite their low probabilities. Another example is the 
anchoring effect, wherein “people rely too heavily on initial impressions of risk and 
discount later information.”123 Representativeness effect is also applicable, as people use 
previous events to estimate the probability of future events. Related to this is the 
tendency for people to attribute intentionality and patterns to randomness.124 The 
availability heuristic is considered especially pertinent in that people overestimate the 
probability of events when they can picture similar events that are “recent, when they 
create memorable images, and when they receive great publicity.”125 People also 
overestimate risks that are new or uncontrollable.126 Friedman concludes that, when 
combined with threat inflated information created and disseminated by the government 
and associated elites, terrorism is a “perfect storm for provoking fear and overreaction” in 
the public.127 
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Finally, a significant sociological concept serving to sustain Americans’ fear of 
terrorism is the application of Stanley Cohen’s “moral panic” framework. James Walsh 
explains the original moral panic framework as a term “meant to capture episodes—
initiated by moral crusaders, perpetuated by media sensationalism, and reproduced 
through state practice–involving hysterical reactions and hyperbolic fear towards ‘folk 
devils’ conceived as threatening social order and communal values.”128 In other words, 
out groups are identified as socially disruptive, vilified by the media, and targeted by the 
state and within political discourse. Initiators of moral panics have conventionally been 
either the public at large, “moral entrepreneurs” attempting to eradicate a specific “moral 
evil,” or elites trying initiate a propaganda campaign in order to “divert attention from 
and avoid solutions to deeper structural problems that threaten elite interests.”129 There is 
general agreement among sociologists that 9/11 initiated an extreme moral panic “defined 
by exaggerated threats, moralistic discourse, and disproportionate response.”130 Walsh 
further expands the concept’s application by considering terrorists as agents actively 
cultivating moral panic in order to “inflat[e] their threatening status and induc[e] 
hysteria” in an effort to affect political change.131  
E. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Previous broad studies answering this research question have emphasized various 
combinations of the factors discussed in the literature review above. Nacos and her 
colleagues, for example, concentrate on the interrelation of the news media and popular 
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culture, the Internet, and political elites after 9/11. Mueller focuses on the nexus of 
politicians’ and “terrorism industry” incentives. Woods and Freidman emphasize the 
sociological and psychological factors that made Americans more receptive to receiving 
and accepting inflated terrorist threat estimates. Lustick perhaps comes the closest to 
integrating all of these factors, but his analysis lingers on the notion of an actively 
conspiratorial cabal within the Bush administration post-9/11.  
This thesis, however, analyzes these factors in combination, and also examines 
them from both a pre and post-9/11 perspective which no other prior work does. The 
argument made is that a specific combination of these factors, namely a changed media 
landscape, evolved popular culture focus, expanded use of the Internet, and increased 
incentives for politicians and members of the “terrorism industry” have worked together, 
positively reinforced by innate human sociological and psychological features, to produce 
a sustained collective psychosis, or culture of fear, that distorts Americans’ perceptions of 
the threat of terrorism post-9/11.  
This argument warrants further explanation. First, regarding the news media, the 
shifting emphasis from hard news to “infotainment” resulted in the media over-reporting 
terrorism-related content, thus forfeiting its “watchdog” role and allowing the 
government to set the public agenda and flaunt the terrorist threat to its advantage. 
Second, popular culture’s increased focus on terrorism-related themes altered viewers’ 
perceptions of reality, especially regarding the nature, scale, and scope of the terrorist 
threat. Third, expanded use of the Internet allowed Al Qaeda and its affiliates to directly 
propagate threats and messages to the public, thus bypassing traditional media 
“gatekeepers” and creating the illusion of a more widely distributed and capable Al 
Qaeda threat. Fourth, politicians, consciously or unconsciously, rhetorically elevated the 
terrorist threat in order to garner support for policies or for electoral purposes. Fifth, 
members of the “terrorism industry”—including security-related businesses, but 
especially government bureaucrats, intelligence analysts, academics, and think tanks—
whose financial or career lifeblood depended on the government’s continued focus on the 
terrorism threat, also facilitated an inflated sense of terrorist threat. Ultimately, these 
factors coalesced during and after 9/11 to create a collective psychosis among the 
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American public, triggering mass sociological responses that subsequently sustained a 
positively re-enforcing cycle responsible for inflating Americans’ fear of terrorism for 
more than a decade.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter I has reviewed the evolution of the terrorist threat and the public’s 
perception of the threat in the United States before the OKC bombing and post-9/11 
(approximately 1991–2011). This established that the scale and intensity of the terrorist 
threat did not necessarily change, though Americans’ perceptions of the terrorist threat 
did change. Chapter II evaluates the changing news and popular culture landscape and 
expanding use of the Internet. This will reveal that the public was not only bombarded 
more by news reports, images, video, and social media feeds flaunting the terrorist threat 
post-9/11 than pre-9/11, but also that dissenting voices or countering perspectives were 
diminished or absent, thus facilitating an increased and prolonged public fear of the 
terrorist threat. The chapter will also expose the incentives that fostered the changing 
landscape. Chapter III investigates shifting political elite and other terrorism industry 
incentives. This will highlight how financial, political, and bureaucratic incentives 
translated into higher levels of rhetoric, policies, intelligence and government reporting, 
and punditry post-9/11 that propagated to the public an inflated threat of terrorism. The 
chapter will also explain why these incentives materialized post-9/11 and not after the 
OKC bombing. Chapter IV analyzes the impact of the proposed factors on producing a 
collective and sustained American psychosis, or culture of fear. This will tie together the 
interrelated aspects of the proposed factors to explain how the factors’ collective presence 
post-9/11, and absence pre-9/11, explains Americans’ distorted perceptions of the threat 
of terrorism. The chapter will close with policy and future research recommendations. 
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II. ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE NEWS MEDIA, 
THE INTERNET, AND POPULAR CULTURE 
A generally agreed-upon theme among media scholars is that much of what 
Americans know about the world comes from what we watch and read rather that our 
personal experiences.132 As such, how the mass media, including the news and film and 
television dramas, portray a subject and how effectively and broadly messages are 
propagated matters as to how Americans perceive that subject. That concept applies to 
Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat as well. Indeed, as this thesis argues, it is 
likely that Americans’ shifting perception of the terrorist threat is largely due to changes 
in the media landscape. The following sections reveal that changes to the way terrorism 
has been portrayed in the news media and film and television drama are clearly evident 
before and after 9/11. Similarly, use of the Internet has expanded greatly by both public 
consumers and those terrorist organizations seeking to propagate their threatening 
presence. As a result of these changes, Americans’ fear about the terrorist threat has 
increased and remained elevated in relation to the scale and intensity of terrorism in the 
United States post-9/11. 
A. ASSESSING THE NEWS 
As discussed in Chapter I, research suggests that Americans’ fears about terrorism 
have been elevated partially in response to the way the news media has portrayed the 
terrorist threat. This section examines the secondary literature to determine how, and to 
what extent, the news media’s depiction of terrorism changed before and after 9/11. This 
section first considers evidence that the news has shifted away from hard news coverage 
of terrorism events to more dramatic and emotional coverage. It then studies the frames 
by which terrorism is portrayed in the news. Finally, this section analyzes whether the 
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news media upheld its watchdog role during and after 9/11 or if it allowed political elites 
to set the news agenda. 
1. News as Public Drama 
As previously discussed, Brian Monahan, in Shock of the News, argues that the 
news media shifted before 9/11 to a focus on news as public drama, that is, “news that is 
fashioned into dramatic and emotional stories.”133 Other scholars appear to support 
Monahan’s claim as evidenced below. Data clearly support the premise that news media 
has both made a dramatic shift towards soft news coverage and that market pressures 
have affected both news content and presentation. 
First, data from a 1998 study by the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence 
in Journalism indicates that there has been a marked shift in both topics of the news and 
emphasis within the coverage itself: “there has been a shift toward lifestyle, celebrity, 
entertainment and celebrity crime/scandal in the news and away from government 
and foreign affairs…There is an even more pervasive shift toward featurized and people-
oriented approach to the news, away from traditional straight news accounts (see 
Table 1).”134 Reviewing the coverage of several media outlets, including the main 
network newscasts and frontpage coverage in major newspapers in 1977, 1987, and 1997, 
the study found that straight news coverage (i.e., “what happened yesterday”) dropped 40 
percent from 1977 to 1997. Moreover, in 1977, stories with traditional news emphasis 
were presented twice as often as feature or scandal stories (i.e., emphasis on “people, 
human interest and news you can use”), whereas in 1997 the ratio was reversed.135 
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Table 1.   Shifting News Subjects and Emphasis (1977–1997).136 
 
 
In addition to shifting themes, the subject of news reporting also shifted. 
Traditional subjects, such as government, military, and domestic and foreign affairs 
declined from 66 percent of coverage in 1977 to 49 percent of coverage in 1997. 
Simultaneously, reports with “feature” subjects, such as entertainment and celebrities, 
and lifestyle, increased from 5 percent to 11 percent. Other topics, such as science and 
religion, also received greater attention.137 
While the above data covers long-term trends pre-9/11, other research suggests 
further changes in news coverage post-9/11, with a temporary bump in hard news 
coverage immediately after the attacks that quickly dissipated. For instance, a report by 
the Pew Research Center in 2002, focused on network television, noted that celebrity and 
lifestyle coverage had returned to pre-9/11 levels by the following summer and hard news 
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coverage was also on the decline (see Table 2).138 The study concludes that “the findings 
seem to refute the idea that television journalism was somehow scared straight or 
fundamentally changed by the attack on America and the War on Terrorism.”139 
Table 2.   Evening News Coverage (June 2001–April 2002).140 
 
 
Another study conducted by the Pew Research Center, in coordination with 
Andrew Tyndall, also confirms the trend by comparing news time dedicated to various 
news subjects on the top evening news networks across two time periods, 1997–2000 and 
2002–2005. The report found that, although terrorism and foreign policy stories 
essentially replaced other domestic coverage post-9/11, “the mixture of hard news and 
feature of lifestyle coverage, meanwhile, has remained virtually unchanged (see Table 
3).”141 All the data appear to support Monahan’s assertion that the news media has 
softened. Moreover, 9/11 does not appear to have altered that trend in any definitive way. 
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Table 3.   Minutes of Evening News Coverage by Subject and 
News Style (1997–2000 vs. 2002–2005).142 
 
 
Several scholars have also argued that the news media’s shift to soft news is 
driven primarily by market or structural forces, especially in response to increasing 
competition from cable and online news.143 The Pew Research Center suggests that, 
“clearly these shifts in topic and thematic emphasis represent the media covering a 
broader spectrum of news, searching for new relevant topics in the face of declining 
audience share.”144 Analysis of available data regarding news audiences and news 
interest supports these assertions. 
During this thesis’ focus period, news audiences increasingly received their news 
from multiple sources, fueling competition for audience among news sources. This is 
especially true considering the influx of news coming from online sources post-9/11. 
According to one Pew Research Center Report, only 13 percent of poll respondents said 
they received “most of [their] news about national and international issues” from the 
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Internet in 2001, while the percentage of respondents getting news from television and 
newspaper were 74 percent and 45 percent, respectively (respondents could give two 
main sources). By 2010, 41 percent of respondents were getting their news online, versus 
66 percent and 31 percent of television viewers and newspaper readers, respectively (see 
Figure 5).145   
Figure 5.  Where Americans Get Most of their National and 
International News (2001–2010).146 
 
Note: According to the Pew Research Center, “Figures add to more than 100 percent 
because respondents could volunteer up to two main sources.” 
Moreover, though television clearly remained a dominant source of news during 
this period, viewership within the medium was fragmented. One survey data set 
compared network, cable, and local television news source trends before and after 9/11, 
from 1993–2003. The data shows that, in 1993, Americans nearly evenly got their news 
from a mix of network and cable news, with local news being a slightly less popular 
source. By 2003, cable news outpaced network and local news significantly. A 
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subsequent data set from Pew showed that cable continued to dominate through 2010 
(see Figure 6).147 
Figure 6.  Where Americans Get Their Television News (1993–2003).148 
 
Note: According to the Pew Research Center, “Figures add to more than 100 percent 
because respondents could volunteer up to two main sources.” 
Beyond Americans’ changing preference for where they received their news, 
changes in the total volume of news consumption and the way people consumed news 
also occurred. In television, for example, evening news audience declined steadily from 
1980 to 2010, losing nearly 29 million viewers total, or more than half of its audience.149 
At the same time, cable news primetime audience counts increased more than twofold, 
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from 1.7 million to 3.8 million from 2001 to 2009. This reflects similar trends in daytime 
cable viewership as well.150 Additionally, newspaper circulation declined, with daily 
paper distribution declining 30 percent from 1990 through 2010.151 Finally, though 
general interest in the news remained mostly unchanged pre and post-9/11, the way 
people consumed news shifted.152 In line with increased cable news viewership and 
online news consumption, nearly 48 percent of respondents in a 2002 survey described 
themselves as “news grazers” who checked news in shorter intervals throughout the day 
compared to 49 percent of people who consumed news at habitual or regularly scheduled 
times.153 In other words, two major structural factors were at play in the 1990s through 
the 2000s: first, generally speaking, fewer people were getting news from traditional 
news sources, such as television and newspapers, and second, within television, 
traditional evening news shows faced increasing competition from always-available cable 
news networks. 
The above data supports Monahan’s suggestion that the news media has shifted 
from a hard news focus to news as public drama during the time period studied in this 
thesis. As the Pew Research Center concluded in 2004, “a growing number of news 
outlets are chasing a relatively static or even shrinking audience for news…putting 
pressures on revenues and profits, which leads to a cascade of other implications.”154 
Some of those implications were a focus on investing in news dissemination rather than 
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collection, a tendency to fill news holes with “raw elements of news” rather than quality 
reporting, varying journalistic standards within news organizations attempting to deliver 
news “across different programs, products, and platforms,” and greater vulnerability to 
press manipulation “as more outlets compete for information” and “their stories contain 
fewer sources.”155  
In essence, throughout the period studied in this thesis, the news media assembled 
itself as a commodity, leading to the rise of news as infotainment, as described by 
Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Shapiro in Selling Fear: 
Counterterrorism, the Media, and Public Opinion.156 
In the competition for audience share, even organizations once committed 
to quality public affairs news have moved increasingly away from 
reporting what professional journalists, editors, and producers deem 
important for the enlightenment of fellow citizens to what profit-oriented 
corporate managers consider interesting for the entertainment of news 
consumers. As a result, “hard” news has been crowded out by “soft” news 
and has become increasingly a blend of information and entertainment—
”infotainment” in the guise of news reporting.157 
In other words, it is fair to say that, due to market and structural forces, the news media 
landscape was primed to proliferate infotainment, or news as public drama, in order to 
boost market share when 9/11 occurred. 
2. Reporting Terrorism in the News 
The implication of the previous section’s conclusion is that terrorism fits the 
requirements of public drama and infotainment, terms this thesis considers synonymous, 
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particularly well.158 Nacos and associates make this argument, especially as represented 
by so-called new terrorism as exemplified by 9/11 and the War on Terror.159  
Infotainment thrives on the images and themes that terrorist incidents 
offer: drama, tragedy, shock, fear, panic, grief…Similarly, news narratives 
and images that amplify the threat of terrorist violence and the war 
metaphor are likely to hold the attention of audience in targeted societies. 
Thus…media organizations’ self-interest would be well served by 
magnifying and prolonging the fear and anger associated with the specter 
of war as expressed by “Attack on America” and “America’s New 
War.”160 
This section explores whether or not the news media did present terrorism as 
infotainment, focusing on an examination of news frames used to present terrorism and 
the relative volume of terrorism reporting. 
First, regarding the sheer volume of terrorism coverage in the news, 9/11 marks a 
clear break in reporting habits compared to before 9/11. For example, in one study 
examining newspaper content from 1977 to 2006, researchers found that the Washington 
Post printed an average of 525 terrorism-related articles per year until 9/11, whereas in 
2003, the low-print year for terrorist articles post-9/11, the same newspaper published 
nearly 3,500 articles (see Figure 7).161 Moreover, as one might expect, the prominence of 
terrorism-related articles also increased, with nearly a 41 percent increase in probability 
that terrorism-focused articles would be on the front page and word count expanded by an 
average 311 words per article.162 
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Figure 7.  Total Number of Washington Post Terrorism-Related Articles (1977–2006).163 
 
 
Furthermore, according to the Tyndall Report, review of network evening news 
coverage also revealed a less dramatic, though still apparent, break in coverage pre- and 
post-9/11, with an extended peak of terrorism-related coverage surrounding the OKC 
bombing in 1995 as well as 9/11 (see Figure 8).164 
Figure 8.  Nightly News Terrorism-Related Coverage (1988–2011).165 
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While the total volume of terrorism news coverage appreciably increased after 
9/11, the more telling revelation lies with an examination of the content of that coverage. 
For example, one study analyzing New York Times front page stories, from four months 
prior to four months after 9/11, found that not only did the volume of terrorism-related 
stories increase seven-fold, terrorism as the “highly central” or “integral point of the 
article” increased from 47 percent pre-9/11 to 68 percent post-9/11.166 Moreover, the 
study noted that while 9/11 was the predominant topic of the highly central terror-themed 
article, it was not the only one, as coverage also included topics such as Afghanistan, 
bioterrorism, and coverage of the Middle East in general.167 Furthermore, though 
government officials post-9/11 continued to be the predominant source of “terrorism 
attribution”—that is, the source identifying an article subject or an event as related to 
terrorism—a larger variety of sources became terrorism designators post-9/11.168 Indeed, 
terrorism designations by non-government and non-Times “professionals, experts, critics, 
or advocates” increased from 3 percent pre-9/11 to 28 percent post-9/11.169 In short, there 
were significantly more articles focused on terrorism and a larger variety of sources 
associating articles and subjects with terrorism after 9/11 than there were before 9/11. 
Post-9/11, news media coverage also appears to have prioritized coverage of the 
terrorist threat in relation to other aspects of the subject. For example, Nacos and 
associates, in a study covering evening television news coverage for 39 months after 
9/11, found that the news reported the threat of terrorism more than terrorism prevention 
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efforts by a ratio of nearly four-to-one.170 Even within the segments focusing on 
prevention, messages emphasizing the terrorism threat outnumbered messages focused on 
security measures, issues, or problems by nearly the same ratio.171 Furthermore, the study 
found that, when an assessment of prevention measures was reported, negative 
evaluations were five times more prevalent than positive ones, especially regarding 
federal prevention efforts.172 Thus, Nacos and associates conclude that, as a result of the 
lack of relative attention paid to terrorist prevention compared to the terrorism threat, “the 
American public has come to have mixed confidence in the government’s ability to 
prevent terrorist attacks.”173 
In a companion study of the evening news during the same 39-month period, 
Nacos and associates also found that “Americans’ concerns about the threat of terrorism 
within their own borders remained quite high during the post-9/11 years and actually 
increased frequently in the wake of increases in reporting of threats and terrorism 
alerts.”174 Moreover, the study revealed that the news media over-reported the threats the 
public was most responsive to: terrorism alert warnings from the government and threats 
from Al Qaeda. Of the 23 national alert warnings issued during the study’s time period, 
100 percent of raised alert levels were reported as lead stories, averaging 5 minutes and 
20 seconds of coverage. In contrast, only 13 percent of lowered alert warnings were lead 
stories, averaging only 1 minute and 34 seconds (see Figure 9).175 
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Figure 9.  Terror Alert Warnings Coverage in the Evening News (2001–2004).176 
 
 
Regarding direct threat coverage, over 50 percent of stories focused on Al Qaeda 
messages were lead stories averaging nearly four minutes. Furthermore, 28 percent of 
President George W. Bush’s statements, 22 percent of terrorism experts’ statements, and 
100 percent of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials’ statements, were in response 
to messages from Al Qaeda leaders.177 Ultimately, the study concludes that media 
coverage of the terrorism threat increased the public’s concern about the terrorism threat 
generally, but that over-coverage of official terror alert warnings and threats from Al 
Qaeda led to intermittent spikes in concern about imminent terror attacks.178 
Several studies also describe how the news media portrayed the nature 
of the terrorist threat post-9/11. Nacos and associates, for example, found that most 
post-9/11 evening news messages related to attack prevention assumed future attacks 
would resemble 9/11. 59 percent of news messages were concerned with aviation 
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and airport security and 12 percent focused on weapons of mass destruction; only 
3 percent focused on seaports and shipping, 1 percent on roads and railroads, 4 percent on 
buildings and infrastructure, and 20 percent on general terrorism prevention (see 
Figure 10).179 
Figure 10.  Evening News Terrorism Prevention Focus Areas (2001–2004).180 
 
 
The results of a study by Joshua Woods reviewing newspaper articles from 1997–
2005 also found that post-9/11, one in five articles “associated the threat of terrorism with 
religion, and the great majority of these made references to Islam.”181 While Woods takes 
no position regarding the debate about the religious motivations for terrorism, he 
concludes that, in the press, “religious identities and motives were often associated with 
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the most frightening portrayals of terrorism risk in the United States.”182 In essence, the 
news media post-9/11 appears to have framed reporting using elements of the new 
terrorism narrative by concentrating on prevention of future spectacular, 9/11-style 
attacks and the religious nature of the terrorist threat. 
In summary, data from past studies shows that a) there was significantly more 
reporting related to terrorism post-9/11, b) the increased coverage was dedicated more to 
the threat of terrorism than to other related subjects, such as prevention efforts, and c) the 
nature of the terrorist threat was framed in terms of sensational 9/11-style attacks and 
linked to religious motivations. In combination with the previous evidence supporting 
arguments about the so-called softening of news coverage, this sub-section’s data appears 
to bolster claims that the news media’s coverage post-9/11 did present the terrorist threat 
as infotainment and public drama, at least partially. 
3. Setting the News Agenda 
As noted in the literature review, some scholars suggest that post-9/11, the news 
media failed to uphold its role as the government “watchdog,” thus allowing the 
government to set the public agenda without the media’s critical review or analysis of 
terrorism messaging and policies.183 This section considers the validity of these claims, 
ultimately finding that post-9/11, the news media did defer to government sources. 
David Altheide, in his review of the state of research on the topic through 2006, 
noted that “The role of the news media is very important in carrying selective news 
sources’ messages...” and “…the White House influence on news content was aided by 
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other government and military officials who also dominated news reports about terrorism 
and fear.”184 Citing several reports outlining the media’s reliance and deference to 
government officials, Altheide then analyzed newspaper content 18 months before and 
after 9/11, determining that associations between terrorism and fear increased by a 
minimum of nearly 1,000 percent in all five newspapers he examined (see Figure 11).185 
Altheide explains the implications of his study, which dovetails with this thesis’ earlier 
findings: “Journalistic accounts about terrorism reflect news organizations’ reliance on 
official news sources to provide entertaining reports compatible with long-established 
symbols of fear, crime, and victimization about threats to individuals and the United 
States in the ‘fight against terrorism.’”186 
Figure 11.  Percentage Change in Occurrence of Newspaper Stories with “Fear” and 
“Terrorism” within Two-Words of Each Other (2000–2002).187 
 
Note: LAT=Los Angeles Times, NYT=New York Times, WPOST=Washington Post, SF 
Chron=San Francisco Chronicle. 
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Altheide’s assertions are also supported by data from the Pew Research Center. 
For example, one study analyzing media content between September and December 2001 
found that “The percentage of stories that might be perceived as largely providing ‘the 
other side,’ or dissenting from the Administration point of view, never exceeded 10 
percent.”188 In contrast, 62 percent of all relevant stories during the study period were 
counted as containing “All” or “Mostly” pro-official policy positions, compared to only 
30 percent that were “mixed” and only 8 percent that were “mostly” or “all” dissenting 
(see Table 4).189 
Table 4.   News Media Viewpoints on Official United States Terrorism 
Response Policies (September–December 2001).190 
 
 
The same study also found that, immediately after 9/11, the press used multiple 
sources while reporting, but that a return to using limited sources had declined 
significantly only months later (see Table 5). Notably, newspapers tended to use the most 
sources while as much as half of television news referred only to a single source. 
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Table 5.   Number of Sources Used by News Media (September–December 2001).191 
 
 
Taken together, the data suggests that, post-9/11, the news media overwhelmingly 
propagated official policy, relied on fewer sources over time, and that the sources they 
did cite generally did not disagree with official policy. Relatedly, Nacos and associates 
found that “in the months and even years following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, officials in 
Washington—especially the president and members of his administration—were able to 
set the media agenda when that was their intention. As long as these political elites held 
news conferences, gave speeches, granted interviews, and otherwise went public, the 
television networks provided them with frequent and prominent coverage to make their 
case and in fact dominate the news.”192 Their analysis finds that, in regard to 
counterterrorism, the president and the administration received one-fifth of coverage 
about the terrorist threat, nearly as much regarding civil liberties policies, and nearly a 
quarter of all coverage concerning the build-up of the Iraq war case. Only when the 
administration had little interest in projecting a particular position, such as with terrorism 
prevention or preparedness, did other “experts” enjoy access to the media (see Table 6). 
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Table 6.   Percentage of News Messages by Source.193 
 
Note: The table does not include foreign sources, thus percentages may not add up to 
100 percent. 
As Shana Gadarian explains in her post-9/11 study about the influence of 
terrorism news on public opinion, “In times of crisis, citizens turn to the government and 
mass media for answers, comfort, and protection.”194 Post-9/11, as this section has 
demonstrated, the news media projected the threat of terrorism perhaps more than was 
warranted. This was likely due to the increasingly competitive nature of the news media 
landscape, which employed infotainment to capture audience attention. It was also likely 
due the news media’s tendency to uncritically allow the government to set the news 
agenda post-9/11. Ultimately, as Nacos and associates conclude, the media “did not 
inform the public fully about the most important events, developments, issues, and 
problems concerning counterterrorism; they did not provide a forum for real debate; and 
they did not scrutinize the selling of fear and the so-called War on Terrorism.”195 
However, as the next sections will demonstrate, factors within the news media itself were 
not the only source responsible for elevating Americans’ perceptions about the post-9/11 
terrorism threat. 
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B. TERRORISM, THE INTERNET, AND MASS SELF-COMMUNICATION 
Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat was also affected by terrorists’ use of 
the Internet to spread propaganda and threats. As Nacos explains in her comprehensive 
work Mass-Mediated Terrorism, traditionally, the news media “are not simply neutral 
and passive information and communication conduits but control the most important 
space in the triangle of communication [between the media, public, and government]. 
From this perch, media gatekeepers include and exclude, magnify and minimize.”196 In 
other words, the news media has traditionally taken an active role in shaping terrorists’ 
efforts at communicating through “propaganda by deed.”197 However, Nacos notes that 
the so-called digital revolution has eroded the news media’s gatekeeper role and enabled 
so-called mass self-communication:  
…today the Internet hovers over, circumvents, and connects with the 
triangular mass communication model. Instead of depending solely on 
traditional media or traditional alternative media, individuals and all kinds 
of groups and organizations, including terrorists, now have direct, easy, 
and fairly inexpensive access to computer-aided communication, most of 
all social media networks.198 
Moreover, besides terrorists’ ability to directly mass-communicate through the Internet, 
conventional news media tend to amplify terrorists’ Internet messages by, for example, 
showing terrorist groups’ online videos on network television.199 This section explores 
the data available to support the above argument, ultimately finding that 9/11 did mark 
the beginning of a significantly increasing terrorist online presence that likely increased 
Americans’ fear of the terrorist threat in the United States. 
1. Americans’ and Terrorists’ Use of the Internet 
As Gabriel Weimann, Nirit Weiss-Blatt, Germaw Mengitsu, Maya Mazor 
Tregerman, and Ravid Oren highlight in their review of the role of digital media in mass 
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communication, American Internet use increased dramatically beginning in the mid-
1990s, from 14 percent of the population in 1995 to 81 percent in 2012.200 Furthermore, 
citing Pew Research Center polling data from 2012, the authors found that a rapidly 
growing number of Americans received their news through online sources, especially 
through social media after about 2008.201 Indeed, Pew data shows that, in 1996, only 2 
percent of Americans went online for news three or more days per week; by 2012, 46 
percent of Americans did so, with 20 percent of news coming from social media sites (see 
Figure 12).202 As noted, social media became popular in about 2008 and has grown 
exponentially since then. In fact, in July 2011, Americans collectively spent 88 billion 
minutes using social media; by July 2012, that had increased an astonishing 37 percent to 
121 billion minutes.203 Weimann cites one report that states Americans, in 2013, 
individually spent nearly 23 hours per week emailing, texting, and using social media.204 
Moreover, 87 percent of Americans polled reported logging into Facebook, the most 
popular social media service, at least weekly.205 YouTube, a video sharing service, boasts 
equally impressive penetration: an average of one billion users watch six billion hours of 
video per month, with nearly a third of that traffic coming from the United States 
alone.206 
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Figure 12.  Percentage of Americans Accessing News Online (1995–2012).207 
 
 
Given Americans’ affinity for widely accessible online news and social media, 
Weimann and associates argue that, “people can form their own agendas and then find 
groups with similar agendas. The Internet makes it possible for people all around the 
globe to find others with similar agendas and collaborate with them.”208 However, 
Weimann and associates note that the results of multiple studies are mixed as to whether 
online sources, such as blogs, can set the public agenda as a whole.209 That being said, 
the authors agree that online media, such as blogs, “are sometimes able to influence what 
counts as newsworthy.”210 Moreover, Weimann and associates posit that, because of the 
relatively low cost and ease of access to the Internet, traditional gatekeepers’ authority 
has been undermined: 
In the conventional media, the institutional gatekeepers could determine 
who and what are worthy of exposure and publicity. However, in the new 
media environment, it is enough for a person to have a computer, Internet 
access, and fundamental proficiency in language and online 
communication in order to produce content and proliferate it on virtual 
platforms and social networks. 
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In other words, traditional news media’s ability to set the public agenda has been 
undermined by widespread Internet use. 
Focusing on political violence and the Internet, Weimann found that terrorists’ 
exploitation of the Internet mirrored the online trends discussed above. For example, in 
1998, only about 15 of 30 terrorist groups on designated “Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations” by the United States had a dedicated website. By 2000, all of those groups 
did. By 2004, Weimann’s count of terrorist group and supporter pages number in the 
hundreds.211 Exemplifying the exponential growth of terrorist Internet activity, by 2008 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates alone operated nearly 5,600 websites in various formats with 
estimates that 900 more would appear every year.212  
2. Propagating the Terrorist Threat through the Internet 
As mentioned in Chapter I, Internet use offered, and continues to offer, several 
advantages for terrorists. Some of those advantages are operational, such as 
disseminating tactically valuable information for conducting attacks. However, in the 
context of this thesis, the advantages regarding mass self-communication have been 
invaluable for terrorists in the aftermath of 9/11. For example, as Naval Postgraduate 
School professor Dorothy Denning describes, post-9/11 terrorist websites, specifically 
those associated with Al Qaeda, included, “writings and audio and video recordings of 
Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qa’ida leaders and operatives; 
horrific videos of bombings, beheadings, and other terrorist acts; fatwas (religious 
edicts); electronic magazines; training manuals and videos; news reports; calls to join the 
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jihad; [and] threats to ‘infidels…’”213 Moreover, Al Qaida cleverly set up several “media 
centers” that operated as “quasi-official production and distribution entities that ‘brand’ 
jihadist media and provide an authorized channel for distribution on approved 
websites.”214 These refined products, especially video clips, were translated into multiple 
languages, uploaded in easily distributable digital formats, and were of sufficient quality 
to be re-broadcast by major news outlets, such as CNN.215 
As a result of terrorists’ extensive use of the Internet for gathering and publishing 
materials, the post-9/11 terrorist threat appears to have metastasized dramatically. For 
example, as Martin Rudner explains, “the Internet has become a powerful catalyst for 
facilitating Al Qaeda-sponsored terrorist activities…[and] has created a threat 
environment wherein terrorist activities can emanate from a large number of countries 
and elements within countries.”216 In other words, the Internet-enabled availability of 
terrorist propaganda, especially from Al Qaeda, facilitated the affiliation of small terrorist 
groups across the globe. Combined with the concerted effort to refine and brand terrorist 
material published online, the terrorist threat appears to have dramatically increased, even 
though, in reality, the scale and intensity of the threat remained the same. 
A staff report presented by the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs in 2008 demonstrates the domestic impact of these trends. The 
report asserts that “the use of the Internet by al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist extremist 
groups has expanded the terrorist threat to our homeland…the threat is now increasingly 
from within, from homegrown terrorists who are inspired by violent Islamist ideology to 
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plan and execute attacks where they live.”217 The staff report projects concern that the 
Internet’s ability to bypass traditional filters of terrorist ideology has enabled so-called 
homegrown terrorism to grow and thrive. The Internet, in other words, has injected the 
wider terrorist threat directly into the United States and has linked otherwise isolated 
individuals with a global terrorist campaign.218 However, by the report’s own admission, 
“to date, cells detected in the United States have lacked the level of sophistication, 
experience, and access to resources of terrorist cells overseas.”219 Moreover, the data 
from Chapter I indicates lack of an increased terrorism threat since 9/11. Thus, while the 
terrorism threat seemed to have increased because of the Internet post-9/11, that 
expansion was in appearance only. 
The rise of social media use by terrorists has only exacerbated the issue described 
above. As Weimann explains, “with social media, information consumers also act as 
communicators, vastly expanding the number of information transmitters in the 
communication market.”220 Rather than the “one-to-many” construct of traditional media, 
including websites, social media networks are “highly interactive platforms through 
which individuals and communities share, co-create, discuss, and modify content.”221 As 
Weimann puts it, terrorists use social media to “virtually ‘knock on the doors’” of target 
audiences as terrorists and their supporters can actively engage with people globally and 
make their content “part of the mainstream.”222 In other words, not only has the Internet 
allowed terrorist groups to circumvent traditional media gatekeepers, social media has 
enabled a whole new form of communication wherein terrorist threats and propaganda 
can be widely spread in novel ways. As an example of the potential expanse of the social 
media landscape, a 2009 analysis of YouTube coverage of Anwar al-Awlaki, a prominent 
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Al Qaeda propagandist, revealed 1,910 of his videos, one of which had been viewed 
164,420 times.223  
While it is difficult to gauge the extent of terrorists’ online reach, it is undeniable 
that terrorists exploited the Internet to propagate the terrorist threat and Americans’ use 
of the Internet increased significantly coincident with 9/11. This has had two major 
effects. First, whereas traditional news media was able to filter terrorist propaganda and 
set the public agenda in the recent past, especially before 9/11, widespread Internet use 
has eroded that barrier between the public and terrorist organizations. Second, Internet-
enabled affiliations among otherwise disparate terrorist organizations and even 
individuals has given the impression that the expanse of groups like Al Qaeda is far 
greater than it actually is. For Americans this gives credence to the notion that the United 
States has indeed been drawn into a Global War on Terror and that the terrorist enemy 
could be anywhere, including within the United States itself. Therefore, this thesis 
concludes that the rapid expansion of Internet use coincident with 9/11 contributed 
significantly to Americans’ fear of terrorism post-9/11. 
C. TERRORISM IN POPULAR CULTURE 
As outlined in Chapter I, some research suggests that popular culture has been an 
important source of influence on Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat. This 
section explores that assertion. It first reviews themes in the literature relating terrorism 
and popular culture. It then examines depictions of terrorism in American film and 
television before and after 9/11.224 Ultimately, this thesis argues that popular culture has 
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influenced Americans’ perceptions of the terrorist threat, starting well before 9/11. 
American movies established Americans’ stereotypical understanding of the terrorist 
threat as fanatical, vicious, and prevalent, and television sustained and even amplified 
that understanding after 9/11. 
1. Related Themes in Terrorism and Popular Culture Literature 
A general theme in literature about popular culture and terrorism is that there is a 
link between the depiction of terrorism in film and television and the public’s general 
perceptions about terrorism. David Altheide, for example, states that, “we learn about the 
world and how the world is run through the mass media and popular culture.”225 Nacos’ 
research supports Altheide, leading her to liken popular culture to “adult education,” 
meaning that television and film inform the viewer’s perception rather than reflect it.226 
Citing a 1994 study by Carpini and Williams, Nacos observes that, “participants in focus 
groups referred slightly more often to fictitious TV shows than news programs in 
political discourse.”227 
Moreover, this phenomenon is not limited to members of the general public. 
Nacos highlights three prominent examples of Jack Bauer, the television show 24’s lead 
character, being referenced by public officials. For example, John Yoo, author of the 
Bush administration’s 2002 Torture Memos, asked “what if, as the popular Fox television 
program 24 recently portrayed, a high-level terrorist leader is caught who knows the 
location of a nuclear weapon in an American city. Should it be illegal for the president to 
use harsh interrogation short of torture to elicit this information?”228 Similarly, Supreme 
Court Justice Scalia during a 2007 panel discussion on counterterrorism said, “Jack Bauer 
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saved Los Angeles. . . . He saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Are you going to 
convict Jack Bauer? Say that criminal law is against him? Is any jury going to convict 
Jack Bauer? I don’t think so!”229 Finally, Michael Chertoff, Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary, said that Jack Bauer’s need to make risk assessments in 24 “reflects 
real life.”230 
Another common theme in the academic literature on popular culture is that 
popular depictions of terrorism and terrorists are rarely nuanced or explained in any 
depth. Carl Boggs and Tom Pollard, for example, argue that terrorism became a “vital 
source of narratives, fantasies, and myths” for popular culture years before 9/11, 
especially in film, due to its “international intrigue, exotic settings, graphic violence, and 
the putative conflict between good and evil.”231 Boggs and Pollard note that, starting in 
the 1980s, entertainment media focused on the Middle East as the “perfect backdrop” to 
portray a “simplistic ‘madman’ thesis of global terrorism, obsessed with small pockets of 
evildoers…prepared to destroy Western values.”232 As such, the secular and political 
motivations for international terrorism is usually ignored which has led to “caricatured 
jihadic (sic) terrorism” in entertainment media.233 Furthermore, in Yvonne Tasker’s 
exploration of “Terror TV,” she describes the general theme of terrorism-related popular 
culture surrounding 9/11: 
The characteristic narrative and thematic elements of Terror TV include 
the figuring of the United States as a nation under threat, personal bravery 
on the part of men and women operating in dangerous situations, 
deployment of racial and ethnic stereotypes alongside an evocation of the 
state itself as benignly multicultural, and a drive toward a somewhat 
perverse reassurance that the forces of the state can be relied on.234 
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In other words, popular culture projects an existential danger facing the United States 
emanating from non-American “others” that can only be protected by brave agents of the 
state taking extraordinary measures.  
A third argument in the literature is that its content and frames are subject to 
influence by the government and large corporations, especially in film. Termed the 
“Hollywood Propaganda Model” by Matthew Alford, this model closely mirrors Edward 
Herman and Noam Chomsky’s propaganda model for the news media.235 In essence, 
dissenting or critical narratives that challenge government or corporate interests are 
unlikely to gain traction in film or television drama.236 Alford notes that there are very 
few major movie studios and cites statements by studio executives explaining 
their tendency to avoid unfamiliar political narratives. For example, David Kirkpatrick, 
former president of Paramount, said that, “you need a homogenized piece of 
entertainment…something that is not particularly edgy [or] particularly sophisticated.”237 
Moreover, Alford argues that manufacturers paying for product placement in movies put 
filmmakers “under pressure to avoid raising ‘serious complexities and disturbing 
controversies’ because this would interfere with the ‘buying mood’ in the media 
outlet.”238 Finally, Alford highlights the “vast and well-funded public relations divisions” 
of government bureaucracies that “offer special access to the media.”239 By granting 
access to advice and material, government agencies gain some leverage over the content 
of the media they are supporting. 
In conclusion, we can say that popular culture, specifically film and television 
drama, does influence the public’s perception of the terrorist threat. Furthermore, it only 
shallowly represents the complexity of the terrorist threat. Moreover, that representation 
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of terrorism is affected by certain government and corporate influences. The remainder of 
this section analyzes how these assumptions manifest themselves in specific 
representations of terrorism in film and television drama. 
2. Terrorism in Film 
According to Thomas Riegler, “the perception of what terrorism means, how it 
can be understood, is shaped by cinematic images…movies reproduce, charge, and 
disseminate interpretations, ideologies, and world views in contemporary society by 
constructing and filling an imaginary space.”240 Aside from The Sum of All Fears, which 
was in production before 9/11 and is decidedly a Cold War-era effort, no film depicting 
the attacks was released until United 93 in April 2006.241 Therefore, understanding 
Hollywood’s treatment of the terrorist threat in movies before 9/11 is necessary to 
explain Americans’ reaction to terrorism in the years after 9/11. This section argues that 
the terrorist threat in movies shifted from depictions of the Cold War terrorists of the 
1970s to the more modern concept of so-called “radical Islamic terrorists” represented in 
movies like 1998’s The Siege and commonly associated with the post-9/11 new terrorism 
threat. 
Riegler argues that depictions of terrorism in film “correlates with the waves and 
historical development of political violence.”242 As such, during the 1970s, terrorism-
related movies in the United States tended to reflect Cold War themes and increased in 
prominence in parallel with news coverage of global terrorist attacks. The terrorists in 
these films usually were far-left radicals (e.g., The Enforcer, 1976), insurgent guerillas 
(e.g., Victory at Entebbe, 1976), or of the homegrown variety, either psychopaths 
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(e.g., Airport, 1970) or post-war soldiers (e.g., Twilight’s Last Gleaming, 1977). Riegler 
notes that, “where Middle Eastern terrorists appeared, their background was primarily 
secular, [with] national liberation on their agenda.”243 
Events such as the Iran hostage crisis in 1979, the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks 
bombing, and other American encounters with terrorism in the Middle East shifted 
Hollywood’s portrayal of terrorism.244 According to Boggs and Pollard, terrorism in and 
from the Middle East began to supplant Communists as movies’ favored villains.245 More 
importantly, however, encapsulated by the Delta Force franchise (1986–1991), the new 
terrorist enemy “was seen as semi-civilized, violent, shady, beyond redemption, capable 
of horrendous crimes—traits making them suitable for extermination.”246 As Riegler 
explains, “[the terrorist] was finally established as a sworn public enemy of everything 
America stands for.”247 That being said, the terrorists during the 1980s, though they 
typically remained state-sponsored, were often portrayed as caricature Arabs. Riegler 
describes their portrayal in Delta Force: 
When the terrorists are first introduced, they are shown in an extreme low 
angle shot, which further distorts their already shabby appearance with 
their loosened ties, unkempt hair, and maniacal stare. Their savage 
“otherness” is a mixture of ethnicity and psychosis.248 
Thus, the 1980s marks the confluence of movies’ projection of terrorism as both a 
security threat on par with Communism and its association with maniacal Arabs. Navy 
Seals (1990) exemplifies this racially-charged image as the movie’s Arab terrorists are 
referred to as “scumbags” and Beirut is described as a “shithole” full of “ragheads.”249  
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The 1990s witnessed another change in the depiction of terrorists in movies, 
largely in parallel to the end of the Cold War. Rather than featuring state-sponsored 
terrorists, new, decentralized asymmetric threats emerged. Formerly stereotypical villains 
driven by ideology became either associated with crime syndicates or otherwise driven to 
“kill and maim for money.”250 This kind of terrorism figured prominently in the 1990s 
action movies exemplified by films such as the Die Hard franchise (1988–1995), Speed 
(1995), and The Rock (1996). In addition to these “apolitical gangsters,” as Riegler calls 
them, “radical Islamic terrorists” were depicted as fanatically driven to “achieve 
spectacular violence against highly symbolic targets while also inflicting mass 
casualties.”251 Moreover, Boggs and Pollard note that films like True Lies (1994), 
Executive Decision (1996), and The Siege (1998) portray Islamic terrorists devoid of any 
political depth or context as a “personality type [that] exists beyond history, beyond 
politics, beyond psychology; a type so irredeemably evil and irrational that no normal 
mode of interpretation is possible.”252 Even The Siege, which offers at least surface-level 
political rationale for its Islamic terrorists, ends up emphasizing the random and morally 
unrestrained violence committed by the terrorists.253 Tellingly, Boggs and Pollard quote a 
line from The 9/11 Commission Report that could be a description for any number of 
terrorism-related movie plots pre-9/11: “a new breed of Islamic terrorist has emerged 
from the downtrodden societies of the Middle East. Attached to no nation but infiltrating 
many, its strategy is to inflict mass casualties and their aim is to attack no less than the 
heart of Western civilization.”254 Finally, as a notable aside, Boggs and Pollard highlight 
that homegrown, right-wing extremists were virtually absent from any major film 
releases during this time.255 
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Post-9/11, aside from The Sum of All Fears as mentioned earlier, mainstream 
Hollywood films tended to avoid direct depictions of terrorism-related themes in 
response to the shock of the attacks. Instead, movies focused on escapist themes, fantasy 
and science fiction, and family entertainment. The World Trade Center towers were even 
edited out of most films already in production during 9/11.256 When Hollywood finally 
breached the subject with United 93, films became focused on realistic depictions of the 
battle against terrorists. However, despite these films’ cinematic realism, Islamic 
terrorism was still conveyed as existing in a “starkly polarized world where cruel, sadistic 
terrorists filled with irrational hatred attack innocent Americans.”257 Not only did 
Hollywood fail to present a critical or contextualized narrative about the post-9/11 
terrorism threat immediately after the attacks, once resumed, post-9/11 movies continued 
to perpetuate stereotypes and simplistic “good versus evil” narratives. 
3. Terrorism in Television Drama 
The terrorist threat surrounding 9/11 as depicted in television generally resembles 
cinema’s as outlined above—the necessity of combating terrorism as a grave threat to the 
United States is a pervasive theme as is television’s stereotypical depiction of Islamic 
terrorism. However, in contrast to Hollywood movie production, the number of television 
shows directly concerned with terrorism actually increased immediately after 9/11. This 
section briefly discusses the different so-called waves of terrorism-related shows in the 
decade post-9/11, explores how those shows potentially influenced Americans’ 
perceptions of the terrorist threat, and finally outlines some of the specific methods and 
tropes used to project the terrorist threat. 
Largely absent before 9/11, as Stacy Takacs explains, terrorism-focused television 
evolved in waves starting in 2001. The first of these waves, exemplified by the shows 24 
(2001–2014), The Agency (2001–2003), and Threat Matrix (2003–2004), “offered 
melodramatic narratives of U.S. victimization, valor, and vengeance designed to reassure 
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a nervous public that security could be guaranteed through strength.”258 Takacs’ second 
wave, which included later seasons of 24 and Sleeper Cell (2005–2006), evolved 
somewhat in response to the Iraq war, sometimes depicting the government as either 
responsible for terrorism itself or as overreacting to it in some way.259 Finally, the last 
wave shifted to a focus on the “devolution of the War on Terror,” where global 
counterterrorism efforts were run less by politicians than “by intelligence agencies, data 
analysts, and computer technicians.”260 While these shifting perspectives clearly reflect 
the political discourse of their times, terrorism depictions post-9/11 were still ultimately 
offered as “evil by association with foreign territories or people.”261 As Tasker relays in 
her analysis, “the terrorist is a type to which the viewer is given explicit cues, which 
include religion, ethnicity, appearance, and behavior…”262 In other words, although 
terrorism was approached from different outlooks during the various post-9/11 “waves” 
of terrorism-focused television, the source of evil remained constant in its depiction of 
radical Islamic terrorism.263 
Beyond reinforcing the source of the terrorist threat, television shows also 
continually emphasized the expanded scope and nature of the threat. For example, 
terrorist attacks in television shows were often portrayed as occurring in shopping malls, 
in buses, against infrastructure, and in other busy, public locations. As Tasker argues, 
“television terrorism thus affects ordinary life in extreme or violent ways—with the 
nation and its urban and civic spaces repeatedly under attack.”264 In other words, terrorist 
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attacks were depicted as happening anywhere, at any time, to anyone. Similarly, the 
expanse of the terrorist threat in television shows is depicted as so extraordinary as to 
justify coercion and torture in response. As Bloch-Elkon and Nacos put it, “post-9/11 
entertainment productions…spread the message that extraordinary threats require 
extraordinary responses.”265 Indeed, as an indicator of the extent of the portrayed threat, 
Nacos cites data from Human Rights First showing that there were only 47 torture scenes 
in primetime network television from 1997–2000, but 624 torture scenes from 2002–
2005.266 As one might expect, 9/11 was also frequently referenced in terrorism television 
shows. In one example from a 2003 episode of Threat Matrix, a main character is 
vindicated after killing a terrorism suspect during a torture session when her defense team 
appeals to the prevention of another 9/11-style attack as justification for torture. As 
Tasker describes the outcome, “the court ultimately recognizes the validity of the 
outcome [and] the techniques are pronounced legitimate.”267 The effect of referencing 
9/11 thus propagates the understanding that 9/11 was not an isolated, outlier event, and 
that extraordinary measures are justified to prevent more attacks on the scale of 9/11. 
Finally, terrorism television shows post-9/11 relied on presentation styles and 
devices, or tropes, that furthered terrorist stereotypes. For example, Tasker argues that 
when television shows, especially crime dramas, depict terrorism, they often rely on the 
tropes of disguise and deception.268 In other words, the terrorist hides among us. 
However, invariably, the shows reinforce stereotypes as the characters are able to ferret 
out the terrorist and identify him or her, usually by associating them with stereotypical 
“markers of ethnicity and religion.” Moreover, the structure and pace of the shows 
themselves may also oversimplify or distort the terrorist threat. As Hoskins and 
O’Laughlin argue, “dramas such as 24 and Spooks (2002) prioritize immediacy and 
excitement over comprehension or reflection, and may serve to reinforce certain 
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assumptions about terrorist threats.”269 In other words, terrorists are depicted 
stereotypically and the causes of terrorism depicted in isolation from broader contexts 
because the shows’ formats are oriented towards fast-paced and exciting action. 
In sum, terrorism-related television shows surrounding 9/11, like movies, 
projected an image of terrorism consistent with Americans’ perceptions of the terrorist 
threat. Despite approaching terrorism from multiple perspectives, television shows 
continued to propagate the stereotypical terrorist as a fanatical Islamic extremist. 
Moreover, the shows presented terrorism as an extraordinary threat that justified extreme 
countermeasures. Furthermore, terrorist attacks were depicted as likely to happen in any 
place at any time. Finally, the devices and structures of television shows served to only 
reinforce existing stereotypes and limit contemplation about the broader contexts of 
terrorism. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter argued that Americans’ perceptions of the terrorist threat are affected 
in large part by what they read and see in the news, on the Internet, and in popular 
culture, such as in film and television drama. The news made a dramatic shift towards 
soft news coverage and news as public drama, in large part due to structural factors such 
as increased competition for audience share among traditional news sources, cable news 
networks, and the Internet. Moreover, news organizations failed to uphold their watchdog 
role post-9/11. As a result, news audiences were subjected to less-than-objective 
reporting about the terrorist threat post-9/11. Regarding the Internet, terrorist 
organizations exploited the technology, especially social media, to successfully bypass 
traditional media gatekeepers and self-mass communicate their threats and propaganda. 
The Internet also enabled otherwise disparate groups to appear to be connected to a 
larger, even global, movement targeting the United States. Finally, popular culture 
affected Americans’ stereotypical understanding of the terrorism by only superficially 
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representing the threat. Film drama began framing terrorists as fiendish, vicious, and 
prolific well before 9/11 and television drama sustained and amplified depictions of the 
threat well beyond 9/11. In combination, all of these factors caused Americans to fear the 
post-9/11 terrorist threat more than before 9/11. 
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III. ASSESSING TERRORISM INDUSTRY INCENTIVES—
POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS, AND OTHERS 
This chapter explores the incentives politicians, bureaucrats, and other members 
of the terrorism industry, such as security contractors, think tanks, and even academics, 
face with regard to elevating and sustaining the American public’s concern about the 
terrorism threat. As discussed in Chapter I, some scholars argue that political elites have 
used 9/11 as a tool to further political agendas and garner support from their electorate. 
The first section of this chapter assesses those arguments in contrast to the pre-9/11 
political environment. The second section of the chapter examines subsequent arguments 
made about the incentives created in the wake of 9/11 for bureaucrats and other terrorism 
industry members to justify their activities and spending under a counterterrorism 
umbrella. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that, though members of the terrorism 
industry may not choose to elevate and sustain the perception of the terrorist threat in 
every case, there are strong incentives for them to do so and they likely have actively 
done so. 
A. POLITICAL INCENTIVES 
Political elites, especially the president, his or her inner circle, and members of 
congress, are in a position to affect the public’s perception of the terrorist threat. As 
David Altheide explains, “decision makers, who serve as key news sources, can shape 
perceptions of mass audiences.”270 Post-9/11, President George W. Bush continually 
emphasized the threat terrorism posed to the United States, claiming that “the advance of 
liberty is opposed by terrorists and extremists — evil men who despise freedom, despise 
America, and aim to subject millions to their violent rule,” even referring to the “War on 
Terror” as the “defining ideological struggle of the 21st century” as late as 2008.271 
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Likewise, in 2009, former Vice President Dick Cheney, in reference to the possibility of a 
terrorist attack using “a nuclear weapon or a biological agent of some kind” that “would 
involve the deaths of perhaps hundreds of thousands of people,” said, “I think there’s a 
high probability of such an attempt.”272 Both of these statements were made despite the 
lack of a major terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11 or even of credible 
evidence that terrorists could launch a nuclear attack. Given the link between the political 
elite and public perception, the question is why would political elites emphasize, even 
inflate, the threat posed by terrorism in the United States? This section argues that 
political elites tend to inflate the terrorism threat because they are incentivized to, either 
in order to help propel their political agenda or in order to garner support from their 
electorate. 
1. Terrorist Threat Inflation  
Threat inflation has been recognized as a means for political elites to further their 
agenda. Thrall and Cramer define threat inflation as “the attempt by elites to create 
concern for a threat that goes beyond the scope and urgency that a disinterested analysis 
would justify.”273 In their model, threat is first perceived by elites, then communicated 
and subjected to countering narratives from other elites and the media (known as the 
marketplace of ideas), before affecting the public’s perception of the threat, which, in 
turn, drives support for policy or the elites themselves.274 Though there is some debate 
about the best theoretical approach to take for determining what, when, or why threats get 
inflated, as Thrall and Cramer note, “most scholars…acknowledge that threat inflation 
has multiple and interacting causes.”275 In explaining elites’ inflation of the terrorist 
threat, this thesis tends to favor a domestic political approach, wherein elites are 
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incentivized to inflate particular threats in order to “achieve material, policy, and 
electoral goals.”276 
The incentives promoting elites’ terrorist threat inflation have been documented 
by several scholars. For example, Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and 
Gallya Lahav found that, “as perceived threat increased, there was heightened support for 
a wide range of domestic and international government actions to combat the threat of 
terrorism, including overseas military action, a curtailment of civil liberties, and 
increased surveillance and tighter immigration restrictions for Arabs.”277 In other words, 
elevated public perceptions about the threat of terrorism promote support for “aggressive 
national security policy.”278 Benjamin Friedman likewise argues that, “people see threats 
as more legitimate justifications for policies than ideological ends.”279 Thomas Dolan 
and Nathan Ilderton’s work supports this assertion, finding that, “perceived personal 
threat from terrorism is a powerful and consistent predictor that survey respondents will 
make terrorism their first policy priority” whereas other variables, including ideology, 
had “mixed relationships with policy salience.”280 Moreover, in order for elites to ensure 
their policies are enacted, Friedman argues that elites create a “sense of crisis that either 
alarms other veto players into supporting change or convinces them that because the 
public thinks so, compliance is necessary.”281 Ronald Krebs and Jennifer Lobasz apply 
this argument when explaining congressional Democrats’ lack of “vigorous opposition” 
to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 “because the fixing of the War on Terror as the dominant 
discourse after September 11 had deprived [Democrats] of winning arguments, of 
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socially sustainable avenues of reply.” Furthermore, as John Mueller and Mark Stewart 
note, exaggerating the terrorism threat is rarely an accountable offense for politicians, 
whereas a politician with a more modest perspective may find him or herself being 
labeled “soft on terrorism” or blamed if an attack does occur.282 Finally, Veronique de 
Rugy extends the argument to encompass congressional counterterrorism-based pork-
barrel spending, wherein “members of Congress have a strong incentive to steer federal 
money to their districts or to reward particular industries; by contrast, they have little 
incentive to reduce wasteful federal spending.”283 In sum, it is clear that incentives exist 
for politicians to use the terrorist threat to further political agendas. The next section 
examines evidence of politicians actually doing so post-9/11. 
2. The Terrorism Threat and Political Agendas  
During the time period examined in this thesis, 1991 to 2011, a significant shift in 
political elites’ reaction to the terrorist threat became apparent. As Gabriel Rubin and 
others have highlighted, President William J. Clinton generally relied on a limited, law 
enforcement frame (i.e., treating the attacks as crimes) in response to terrorist attacks in 
the United States, whereas President Bush relied on a global war frame in response to 
terrorist attacks during his administration.284 For example, after the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, in response to a reporter’s question about the attack potentially 
changing Americans’ way of life, Clinton responded, “I have put the full resources of the 
Federal Government, every conceivable law enforcement information resource we could 
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put to work on this, we have. I’m very concerned about it. But I think it’s also important 
that we not overreact to it.”285 Clinton had a similar response to the OKC bombing. On 
the day of the attack, he said the government had deployed “the world’s finest 
investigators to solve these murders.” Two days later he stated that, “I think Americans 
can be secure that our country has able law enforcement officials, that we work together 
well, that we have prevented terrorist activities from occurring, that, obviously, every 
civilized society is at risk of this sort of thing.”286 In contrast, in the span of 24 hours, 
Bush went from “direct[ing] the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement 
communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice,” on September 11th, 
2001 to “the deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our 
country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war…Freedom and democracy 
are under attack” on September 12.287 
An argument can be made that this shift was made in response to the incentives 
discussed above. Supporting this argument, Rubin explains that, because Clinton chose to 
use the law enforcement frame, the president’s political agenda, at least in regard to 
counterterrorism, failed to gain immediate traction. Assailing militia groups and right-
wing extremists while seemingly downplaying the wider terrorist threat to the United 
States, Clinton’s legislation faced an unlikely coalition of House Republicans, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, the National Rifle Association, and various Arab and 
Muslim groups who were able to maneuver politically to block passage of the president’s 
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“anti-terror legislation” for more than a year.288 Even when passed, the bill was 
significantly amended and watered down, leading Democrat Chuck Schumer to call it the 
“better-than-nothing anti-terrorism bill.”289 Rubin surmises that Clinton’s policy failure 
was due in large part to the lack of overwhelming personal threat from terrorism 
exhibited by the public after the OKC bombing and the relatively low (in comparison to 
post-9/11) presidential approval ratings which enabled political maneuvering room by 
Clinton’s opponents. This reasoning is supported by Carol Lewis who argues that the 
OKC bombing failed to resonate politically because the public considered the attack to be 
a crime directed at a small segment of the population, namely government employees in 
the workplace.290 She concludes that, like crime, “domestic terrorism is likely to be seen 
as important in general and in the abstract, but with low personal risk, little impact on 
individuals’ routine behavior and, consequently, low political salience. An act of 
terrorism is seen as likely to happen—but to someone else.”291 
In contrast, the Bush administration was able to leverage the War on Terror to not 
only launch a campaign in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda, but also push through the 
Patriot Act, justify “enhanced interrogations,” and, most pertinently, invade Iraq.292 For 
instance, according to a 2007 report by the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency, 
links between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda and 9/11 did not exist.293 However, as 
Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner convincingly argue, “[the reason] the American 
public supported the war was that the Bush administration successfully convinced them 
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that a link existed between Saddam Hussein and terrorism generally, and between 
Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda specifically. Framing the war on Iraq in this way 
connected it intimately with 9/11, leading to levels of support for this war that stretched 
nearly as high as the levels of support for the war in Afghanistan.”294 In other words, the 
Bush administration was able to tap into Americans’ personal concern about the threat 
from Al Qaeda in order to justify its agenda with regard to Iraq. 
Gershkoff and Kushner conducted extensive content analysis of Bush 
administration rhetoric to support their argument. The authors found that the number of 
terrorism-related word mentions (e.g., terror, Afghanistan, Taliban, bin Laden, and Al 
Qaeda) in administration speeches increased to nearly the same levels during the build-up 
to the Iraq invasion as immediately after 9/11 (see Figure 13), but also that, “the subjects 
of terrorism and Iraq were intertwined on a regular basis” and Iraq and 9/11 often were 
juxtaposed.295  
Figure 13.  Iraq and Terrorism Indices (September 11, 2001–March 17, 2003).296 
 
                                                 
294 Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner, “Shaping Public Opinion: The 9/11-Iraq Connection in the 
Bush Administration’s Rhetoric,” Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (September 2005), 525. 
295 Ibid., 526–527. 
296 Source: Ibid., 527. 
 74
The point is most clearly made through the analysis of then-Secretary of State 
Colin Powell’s speech to the United Nations explaining the United States’ rationale for 
invading Iraq in 2003. Polling data shows that an additional 10 percent of respondents 
supported the invasion of Iraq after Powell’s speech and claimed that the speech changed 
their minds. Before the speech, only 38 percent respondents linked Iraq with Al Qaeda, 
whereas 68 percent did so after the speech.297 This is most likely due to Powell’s 
emphasis on the terrorism connection and not on the weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) issue as subsequent polling found that 82 percent of Americans supported 
invading Iraq whether or not any WMD were found.298 Most tellingly, perhaps, is that a 
Gallup poll conducted days after Powell’s speech found that 48 percent of polled 
Americans were very or somewhat worried about becoming the victim of a terrorist 
attack, 13 points higher than the post-9/11 low a year before the speech, six points higher 
than immediately after the OKC bombing, and the highest since the weeks after 9/11 
itself.299 
Regardless of the underlying agenda for invading Iraq, it is clear the Bush 
administration successfully used the War on Terror frame to garner public support for the 
war.300 By shifting away from the limited, law enforcement frame used by Clinton to the 
unlimited, War on Terror frame, the Bush administration was able to drive policy 
salience for a public concerned about Saddam Hussein’s support for future 9/11-style Al 
Qaeda terrorist attacks. The Iraq invasion case exemplifies the incentives for political 
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elites to inflate the threat of terrorism for the public in order to push their political 
agenda. 
3. Using the Terrorism Threat for Electoral Gain 
Another aspect to consider regarding political elites’ incentives is the individual-
level advantages politicians stand to gain from inflating the terrorism threat. From 
presidential approval ratings to congressional elections and intra-party politics, political 
elites likely see little incentive to “inform the public honestly and accurately” as Mueller 
and Stewart implore them to do.301 This section explores how the so-called marketplace 
of ideas broke down post-9/11 as individual politicians benefited from inflating the 
terrorism threat. 
The president is in the unique position to both somewhat control and benefit 
politically from crisis events like terrorist attacks in the United States. Chaim Kaufmann 
suggests that the administration plays a key role in shaping political debate about the 
response to an attack by choosing how to frame the issue, by controlling the selective 
public release of intelligence, and by using its authority positions (such as being able to 
mobilize the armed forces) to set the debate agenda.302 Marc Hetherington and Michael 
Nelson explain that a president can benefit from “rally effects” that bump the president’s 
approval ratings “in response to certain kinds of dramatic international events involving 
the United States.”303 For example, after 9/11, President Bush experienced the largest-
ever public approval bump of this kind, going from 51 percent on September 10th to 86 
percent on September 15th.304 Craig Stapley extends the argument to include domestic 
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terrorism events like the OKC bombing as well.305 In this case, President Clinton’s 
approval bump was more moderate, going from 48 percent to 58 percent before and after 
the attack.306 
Evidence further suggests that the Bush administration was incentivized to sustain 
the public’s perception of the terrorist threat well beyond 9/11 for political purposes. For 
example, Gallup’s Lydia Saad notes how the initial Iraq invasion, justified as part of the 
War on Terror, elevated Bush’s approval rating by 13 points, up from 58 percent to 
71 percent.307 Helmut Norpoth and Andrew Sidman even contend that the Iraq war 
served to prolong the original 9/11 rally effect, helping secure Bush’s 2004 re-election 
victory by keeping the topic of terrorism salient for the public.308 Furthermore, Brigitte 
Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Y. Shapiro found in a four-year study of Bush’s 
statements about terrorism and the administration’s raising of terror alert levels that “as 
the administration issued terror alerts and otherwise magnified the threat of terrorism, the 
president’s approval ratings benefited.”309 Moreover, Nacos and associates point out that 
exit polls and other survey data from the 2004 presidential election found that “Bush 
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benefited from voters most concerned with terrorism.”310 This thesis does not speculate 
about the administration’s intentions post-9/11, but it is apparent that elevating and 
sustaining the terrorism threat benefited the Bush administration politically. 
Beyond the president, evidence suggests other political elites after 9/11 were 
incentivized to elevate and sustain the terrorist threat, or at least disincentivized from 
opposing the president’s position regarding terrorism. As Jane Cramer argues when 
explaining congressional support for the Iraq invasion, “most Democrats and many 
Republicans deferred to the executive branch not on the merits of the case, but because 
they did not want to appear weak on defense or unpatriotic.”311 Cramer explains that 
Congress’ passage of the Iraq War Resolution was not a certainty as the bill faced serious 
bipartisan opposition in the Senate. This opposition survived until presidential hopeful 
House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt (D-Mo) sided with Bush on Iraq. Gephardt 
apparently made this move because he was “conforming to the norm to be ‘strong’ on 
national defense” and because “he contended that Democrats had no choice but to go 
along with Bush on Iraq and they had to try to keep Iraq from becoming the defining 
issue in the upcoming elections.”312 Once Gephardt staked his position, Republicans felt 
they “could not afford to ‘be to the left of Dick Gephardt’” and Democrats facing re-
election “decided they also needed to be ‘strong’ on national security and support the 
commander-in-chief.”313 Thus, because of political incentives, opposition voices that 
could have tempered the president’s War on Terror agenda were ultimately silenced.314 
Post-9/11 political elites’ concerns about the negative consequences of being 
labeled soft on terrorism turned out to be prescient. A notable example of this 
phenomenon is the direct impact Senator John Kerry’s remarks about terrorism had on 
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his 2004 presidential election bid.315 In an unusually candid interview with the New York 
Times in early October 2004, Kerry said that, “we have to get back to the place we were, 
where terrorists are not the focus of our lives, but they’re a nuisance.” He went on to 
draw a parallel between the terrorism threat and other crimes like prostitution, illegal 
gambling, and organized crime. The Bush campaign railed against Kerry on multiple 
fronts. Vice President Cheney called Kerry’s remarks “naïve and dangerous” and the 
Bush campaign released television commercials that asked, “How can Kerry protect us 
when he doesn’t understand the threat?”316 Kerry immediately backtracked from his 
comments, stating in the presidential debate just days later that he would “do a better job 
of waging a smarter, more effective War on Terror and guarantee that we will go after the 
terrorists. I will hunt them down, and we’ll kill them, we’ll capture them. We’ll do 
whatever is necessary to be safe.”317 Unfortunately for Kerry, the political damage had 
been done—exit polls from the presidential election indicated that, of the 19 percent of 
total respondents that considered terrorism to be “the one issue that mattered most in 
deciding how you voted for president,” 86 percent said they voted for Bush.318 The “soft 
on terrorism” lesson was likely internalized by other political elites. As Lustick surmises, 
the post-9/11 War on Terror “transformed its critics into its vassals, more anxious than 
ever to declare their fealty to the war, its necessity, and its expansion.”319 In other words, 
given the public’s reaction to Kerry’s candor, other politicians post-9/11 were unlikely to 
address the terrorist threat as anything other than grave. 
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Lastly, political elites have been incentivized to propagate the terrorism threat 
because of the massive amount of federal funds made available post-9/11 for 
counterterrorism projects. As de Rugy explains, according to public choice theory, “in the 
political process…the people buying [security] are rarely the ones paying for it. As such, 
they have less incentive to balance costs and benefits.”320 Per her example, a 
Congressman from a low population, low risk state has little incentive to admit that his 
state and his constituency is not a likely terrorist target or to shunt federal grant funds to 
other states based on their higher risk. Instead, because pooled federal tax monies are 
distributed to states by the Department of Homeland Security rather than through state 
budgets, politicians “insist that the federal government should pay for their respective 
state response capacities and that federal grants to state and local governments be 
allocated based on a formula that guarantees every state an equal minimum amount of 
funds, regardless of risk or need.”321 As a result of this incentive structure, politicians 
have used the threat of terrorism to justify a litany of state and local expenses, such as 
$180,000 for a port servicing less than 20 ships annually, $202,000 for an 80-camera 
surveillance system in an Alaskan town with 2,400 residents, $30,000 for a defibrillator 
used for a high school basketball tournament, and many others.322 As an example of the 
overall scale of this type of spending, one group, Citizens Against Government Waste, 
calculated that the 2004 Department of Homeland Security bill alone included at least 
$423 million in wasteful spending. Moreover, the 2005 bill included $896 million added 
over the president’s original request.323 Using the terrorism threat to justify federal 
spending on counterterrorism measures has proven to be lucrative for political elites. 
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Ultimately, normative judgements about politicians’ appropriate responses to 
terrorism before and after 9/11 are not this thesis’ focus. Instead, this section has 
attempted to make the argument that political elites are faced with significant incentives 
to inflate the terrorist threat. The point is that, given these political incentives, it seems 
unreasonable to assume that political elites can be relied on to relay an objective or 
“disinterested analysis,” as Thrall and Cramer put it, of the terrorism threat to the public. 
As such, it is certainly possible, if not likely, that political elites have actively inflated 
Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat beyond 9/11. 
B. BUREAUCRATS AND INDUSTRY 
Similar logic applies to the remainder of the terrorism industry, such as 
bureaucrats, security contractors, academics, and think tanks. First, 9/11 heralded a 
massive increase in federal counterterrorism fund availability that was doled out with 
questionable concern for effectiveness or affordability. This provided a significant 
incentive for organizations, corporations, and individuals to sustain perceptions about the 
terrorist threat for economic benefit. Second, certain institutional factors inherent in the 
American political system, such as rent seeking for federal funds, and in security-oriented 
organizations, such as probability neglect during risk analysis, also contributed to 
elevated and sustained perceptions of the terrorism threat. This section explores those 
topics, concluding that natural responses to incentives, not malicious intent per se, likely 
contributed to the public’s understanding of the terrorist threat post-9/11. 
1. Economic Incentives 
While this thesis avoids any normative judgement about how much money should 
be spent on homeland security, it is clear that spending aimed at terrorism has grown at a 
phenomenal rate.324 For example, in her review of federal homeland security budget data, 
economist Veronique de Rugy found that, between 2001 and 2009, annual spending 
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increased by 305 percent, from at least $16.9 billion per year to $68.5 billion (see Figure 
14).325 Moreover, more than $419 billion was specifically appropriated for preventing 
terrorism during the same time period.326 On a similar scale, homeland security scholars 
John Mueller and Mark Stewart have calculated that pre-9/11 annual counterterrorism 
expenditures were about $25 billion (in 2010 dollars), increasing by $75 billion per year 
by 2010.327 All told, Mueller and Stewart tally more than $1 trillion in homeland security 
spending, excluding the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, between 2001 and 2011. Citing de 
Rugy, Mueller and Stewart note that the majority of this spending was focused on 
preventing terrorism.328 
Figure 14.  Homeland Security Federal Spending (FY1995-FY2009).329 
 
Note: Data before 1998 are estimated as the Office of Management and Budget did not 
collect data on this subject then. 
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The increase in post-9/11 security spending significantly incentivized members of 
the terrorism industry to align their cause, effort, or products with the Bush 
administration’s War on Terror. Benjamin Friedman, for example, notes that the 
Department of Defense was rewarded with a 40 percent budget increase (excluding direct 
war spending in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom) between 2001 and 2010 by 
using the threat of terrorism, at least in part, to justify its spending.330 De Rugy’s data 
from the Office of Management and Budget supports this assessment: in 2009 the 
Department of Defense received 26.1 percent of all homeland security funds doled out to 
federal departments, second only to the Department of Homeland Security itself (51.9 
percent).331 Moreover, even as late as 2011, the National Military Strategy listed the fight 
against terrorism as the first of its four National Military Objectives: “There are no more 
vital interests than the security of the American people, our territory, and our way of life. 
This is why we are at war…The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to 
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates.”332 Conspiracies aside, there 
appears to have been an incentive post-9/11 for the military to uphold terrorism as a 
continuing threat. Friedman even goes so far as to argue that terrorism replaced Cold War 
enemies for the military-industrial complex.333 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provides another example of the 
potential incentives government agencies have to align themselves with a focus on 
terrorism. At its inception, DHS’s “founding principle and…highest priority” was (and 
remains) “protecting the American people from terrorist threats.”334 Indeed, DHS’s 2010 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review lists “preventing terrorism and enhancing 
security” as “Mission 1” and states that, “preventing terrorism in the United States is the 
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cornerstone of homeland security.”335 In light of the post-9/11 emphasis on preventing 
terrorism, DHS’s budget increase from $31.2 billion in 2003 to $50.5 billion in 2009 
appears to align with counterterrorism spending generally.336 However, it is important to 
consider that DHS was composed of 22 separate federal departments and agencies, not all 
of whom focused on terrorism.337 Given that fact, one would expect to see a disparity 
between budget increases for agencies responsible for preventing terrorism and those that 
did not. As de Rugy illustrates, this was not the case. For example, after being aligned 
with DHS, a food and shelter program for the poor received an unprecedented 
$153 million budget increase.338 De Rugy cites multiple examples of similar unrelated 
spending increases within DHS, ultimately concluding that “programs that Congress 
might not approve if they were outside of DHS may likely sail through because of their 
DHS affiliation.”339 As such, because non-terrorism oriented agencies in DHS benefited 
from DHS’s terrorist-related budget increase, they also had an incentive to support 
DHS’s campaign against terrorism. 
Of course, including the pork-barrel spending mentioned in the previous section, 
financial incentives to support War on Terror efforts extend beyond federal agencies. For 
example, in 2006, the federal government budgeted $8 billion in homeland security grant 
money for states, cities, and local first-responders, up from $2.7 billion in 2001.340 This 
increase spurred significant lobbying efforts, such as from the 3,000 local officials that 
descended on Washington, DC, on March 4, 2004, followed by an equally robust cohort 
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of firefighters less than two weeks later.341 It also incentivized grant-seekers to creatively 
link their proposals with homeland security, such as one port’s use of a $1 million grant 
to install a system that was primarily an anti-theft system, or the Washington, DC, 
mayor’s $100,000 expenditure on a summer jobs program. One senator described the 
process as follows: “I have heard from individual departments that spending initiatives 
that were pending previously that were not approved, once they were given the label of 
homeland security, whether or not they fit the description, sailed through.”342 In other 
words, because of the financial incentives created by federal homeland security grants 
post-9/11, programs and organizations that might otherwise not be concerned whatsoever 
with homeland security, suddenly found themselves soliciting for funds using that 
justification. 
This phenomenon also appeared in unexpected ways. For example, Ian Lustick 
cites a 2005 report from the Small Business Administration (SBA) that found that 
85 percent of businesses granted counterterrorism loans underwritten by the government 
under the 2002 Supplemental Terror Activity Relief program “failed to establish 
their eligibility.”343 For example, later audits found that $22 million was loaned to 
Dunkin’ Donuts franchises in nine different states in the name of supporting small 
businesses “adversely affected by the [September 11] attacks.” All told, more than 
7,000 questionable loans worth over $3 billion were underwritten by the SBA.344 In a 
similar twist, multiple professional organizations also used the terrorism threat to support 
various agendas. For example, in 2002, the National District Attorney’s Association 
issued a policy both defining terrorism as a crime and decrying its members to engage 
with their legislatures in order “to insure that prosecutors are included in any funding 
legislation.”345 Likewise, in 2003, the Association of American Veterinarian Medical 
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Colleges called for “the national leadership of America…to recognize and nurture the 
potential of the veterinary profession…to meet a national agenda for biosecurity” by 
increasing national funding at veterinary schools.346 Lustick cites similar examples from 
professional pharmaceutical organizations, pediatricians, psychiatrists, and even opposing 
interest groups, such as the gun control lobby and the National Rifle Association, who all 
sought to gain by aligning their cause with preventing terrorism.347 
Academics and think tanks have also benefited from increased spending related to 
terrorism. For instance, the 2006 federal budget allocated $132 billion for scientific 
research, up 34 percent from 2001. Within that increase, defense and counterterrorism 
funding increased 51 percent compared to just 16 percent for all other categories.348 
Other academic institutions also saw a significant post-9/11 jump in both total approved 
grant proposals and total funding related to terrorism research. The National Science 
Foundation, for example, awarded $47.7 million for 135 terrorism research grants from 
2002–2005 compared to just $1.5 million for only eight proposals from 1997–2001.349 
Homeland security and other terrorism-related degree programs also proliferated across 
American educational institutions post-9/11. As early as 2005, the National Consortium 
for Homeland Security listed more than 200 member institutions.350 In 2004, Mel 
Bernstein, then Director of University Programs for DHS, attributed the increase in 
programs to the burgeoning homeland security industry: “If you look across the country, 
almost every company or agency has something they call a ‘homeland security initiative,’ 
and they will need people.”351 DHS also contributed to the academic focus on terrorism 
by establishing multiple Homeland Security Centers of Excellence (there were 12 in 
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2008) wherein DHS grants funded academic research projects, most of which were 
specifically focused on terrorism-related topics.352 
Finally, private industry and even individuals have benefited from the post-9/11 
War on Terror environment. Companies like General Atomics, the maker of the Predator 
and Reaper remotely piloted aircraft, have seen profits soar as a result of their 
participation in the War on Terror. In their case, the company earned $110 million in 
2001 while profits exceeded $1.8 billion in 2012.353 Others, such as military contractor 
CACI, saw profits as high as $3.7 billion as late as 2012.354 At the individual level, Evan 
Kohlmann made upward of $60,000 from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for 
consulting on terrorism investigations dating to 2003 and was routinely paid $300-$400 
per hour for providing his expert testimony in as many as 24 cases.355 As a final example, 
the 2012 Counter Terror Expo in Washington, DC showcased more than 100 companies 
courting potential buyers. Keynote speakers at the event included top Transportation 
Security Administration officials and even the former National Counter Terrorism Center 
director.356 James Risen quotes one vendor who exemplifies the breadth of the industry 
saying “the heightened sense of security absolutely helped our product lines (high-
security fencing) grow. Prior to 9/11, people were just going with chainlink fences.” All 
told, according to Risen, some research has estimated that, by 2022, the terrorism 
industry in the United States will be worth $546 billion.357 
In summary, this section has not attempted to prescribe the optimal level of 
spending for preventing terrorism. Rather, the point is that, post-9/11, significant 
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spending increases related to homeland security generally, and terrorism specifically, 
created an incentive for the beneficiaries of that spending to continue to propagate the 
threat of terrorism in order to justify it. The next section considers factors beyond 
financial incentives that may also contribute to the terrorism industry elevating and 
sustaining the threat. 
2. Institutional Factors 
In addition to the rapid increase in spending related to terrorism post-9/11, several 
institution factors either already existed or were created in response to 9/11 that may have 
contributed to Americans’ inflated perception of the terrorist threat. This section broadly 
considers the way in which spending decisions were made post-9/11 and how threats 
were tracked and relayed to senior government officials. The conclusion reached is that, 
even without considering malicious intent, members of the terrorism industry were 
incentivized by institutional factors to propagate the terrorist threat post-9/11 and it is 
possible, even likely, that they did so. 
Considering the way spending decisions were made post-9/11, two major 
institutional factors can be identified: the decision to spread homeland security funds 
across multiple federal departments and the lack of effective risk-based fund distribution 
by DHS. Regarding the former, de Rugy notes that homeland security funding was split 
between upward of 200 accounts within the federal budget. Moreover, much of the 
funding was allocated within accounts not specifically directed towards homeland 
security (see Figure 15).358 
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Figure 15.  Homeland Security Spending across Federal Departments (FY2009).359 
 
 
In addition, homeland security spending both inside and outside of DHS increased 
at similar rates post-9/11 (see Figure 16). As a result of this funding arrangement, not 
only was “tracking and analyzing [homeland security] spending…proven to be difficult,” 
as the Congressional Budget Office admits, but also the “competition of interests” 
normally inherent to the institutional design of federal agencies failed.360 As Friedman 
explains, “institutional design is the arrangement of tradeoffs among competing risk 
preferences.”361 In this thesis’ context, for example, one can imagine the Department of 
Defense framing the terrorist threat quite differently had all post-9/11 counterterrorism 
funding gone to the Justice Department rather than being shared across departments. 
Likely, the Department of Defense would have focused its budget narrative on the 
importance of preparing for inter-state conflict rather than the counterterrorism 
mission.362 Instead, counterterrorism funding was made widely available across 
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departments, thus limiting competition across mission sets and even incentivizing 
collective agreement about the scale of the terrorist threat. 
Figure 16.  Homeland Security Spending Inside vs. Outside DHS (FY2004–FY2009).363 
 
 
A second major institutional issue regarding federal spending was, and arguably 
still is, the lack of an effective risk-based approach to allocating homeland security funds. 
This stems, in part, from political pressure and Congressional precedent that, “provides 
every state with a guaranteed minimum amount of state grants regardless of risk or 
need.”364 An example of this issue is the State Homeland Security Grant Programs 
(SHSGP). As de Rugy outlines, before 9/11, each state received under $1 million; after 
9/11, as the program ballooned from $97 million total in 2001 to $2.1 billion by 2003, the 
minimum guaranteed amount received by every state was $15.5 million.365 This 
accounted for 40 percent of that program’s total budget. The remaining 60 percent was 
then distributed based on state population, not risk. This political formula led to a 
situation where less populated states were granted more homeland security funds per 
capita than more populated states. For example, California received 7.95 percent of the 
                                                 
363 Source: de Rugy, “Facts and Figures About Seven Years of Homeland Security Spending,” 2. 
364 de Rugy, “What Does Homeland Security Spending Buy?” 15. According to de Rugy, the initial 
Patriot Act included a guarantee that each state would receive .75 percent of the total amount appropriated 
to DHS for states to counter terrorism. In effect, 40 percent of DHS funds were “divided up equally among 
the states, regardless of size, risk, or need.” 
365 Ibid. 
 90
grant money while its population was 12 percent of the nation’s population; Wyoming 
accounted for .17 percent of the population and received .85 percent of the grant money. 
This translates to $4.97 per capita in California and $37.74 per capita in Wyoming.366 As 
such, de Rugy notes that officials from rural and small states thus have a vested interest 
in arguing that their states are as threatened by terrorism as any other places, including 
Washington, DC, or New York City.367 Indeed, subsequent efforts to adopt risk-based 
strategies were rejected by Congress using that very argument.368 
Within DHS itself, proven risk-based strategies for making decisions about 
homeland security spending and focus of effort, outside of natural disasters, have been 
documented as dismally lacking. One 2010 report commissioned by Congress from the 
National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine exemplifies the point: “[the committee] did not find any DHS risk analysis 
capabilities and methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making.” 
Furthermore, “only low confidence should be placed in most of the risk analyses 
conducted by DHS.”369 A major contributing issue is that, as a 2007 Congressional 
Research Service report outlines, from at least 2001 through 2007, DHS neither captured 
nor used data in a meaningful way in order to assess “identifiable and empirical risk 
reductions” gained from the nearly $12 billion spent on countering terrorism to that 
point.370 As a result, DHS was able to only base its spending and effort focus on the 
assessment of relative risk rather than absolute risk.371 Given this structure’s lack of any 
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objective threat standard, those potentially receiving funds are thus incentivized to inflate 
their terrorism risk in order to outrank competitors for the funds. As de Rugy explains 
regarding the issue, “the economic incentive does not seem to favor a proper evaluation 
of [terrorism] risks. Financial stakes are high for state officials who might feel that if their 
state is seen as a non-risk state, no money would be coming their way.”372 
Other than incentives based on post-9/11 spending increases on homeland 
security, institutional factors related to how post-9/11 terrorist threats were identified, 
tracked, and relayed to senior officials also likely contributed to inflating the terrorist 
threat. One of the most pointed examples of this is the so-called “threat matrix” that was 
used to track and communicate the terrorist threat at the highest levels of government 
after 9/11. Mueller and Stewart describe it as “an itemized catalogue of all the ‘threats’—
—or more accurately, ‘leads’—needing to be followed up.”373 The contents of the threat 
matrix were briefed daily to the FBI Director, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
Director, and ultimately formed a portion of the president’s daily brief.374 Originally 
conceived as a working document, however, much of the information within the threat 
matrix was often, as journalist Garret Graff described it, “whispers, rumors, and vacuous, 
unconfirmed information.”375 Indeed, one analyst, Philip Mudd, who worked with the 
document explained it as follows:  
[Included is] everything from unvetted walk-ins around the world—people 
who simply walked into an embassy, for example, and volunteered 
information—to nuts who wrote into U.S. government websites, to 
second-rate sources who made up tales to make a paycheck. All this was 
read by the president, in a document intended initially to serve as a 
working-level draft. What was initially a simple, almost inevitable way of 
tracing threats—it had to be done somewhere—became a means by which 
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senior policymakers reviewed raw material that many of us, myself 
included, thought was ‘below threshold‘ for them.376 
Until at least 2013, the government relied on the threat matrix, populating it daily with 
hundreds of selections from the nearly 5,000 terrorism leads per day pursued by the 
federal government after 9/11.377 Mueller and Stewart attribute the popularity and status 
of the list to a “9/11 Commission Syndrome” where, because of “an obsession with 
the career failures to ‘connect the dots,’ it is in no one’s interest to reduce the length of 
the list.”378 
Given the nature of the threat matrix, perhaps it is unsurprising then that, as 
former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says, “[the 
threat matrix] had a huge effect on our psyches.”379 Another Bush administration 
member, Jack Goldsmith, explains that, “it is hard to overstate the impact that the 
incessant waves of threat reports have on the judgement of people inside the executive 
branch who are responsible for protecting American lives.”380 This effect, dubbed 
“institutionalized paranoia,” aligns with comments made by senior officials regarding the 
post-9/11 terrorist threat. For example, in 2005, then FBI Director Robert Mueller 
testified before Congress that he was “very concerned about what we are not seeing” 
despite the FBI having also reported that it had not found evidence of a single terrorist 
sleeper cell in the United States.381 Likewise, in 2007, the CIA Director testified that his 
“operational presumption is that they infiltrated a second or third wave into the United 
States at the time of 9/11. Can I prove it to you? No. It’s my operational intuition.”382 
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Thus, regardless of incentives to inflate the terrorist threat, it also appears plausible that at 
least some senior officials actually believed that the United States faced a massive, even 
existential, terrorist threat post-9/11 because of the intelligence community’s fear of 
being accused of a “failure of imagination.”383 
The last issue this section considers is politicized intelligence regarding the 
terrorist threat. As explained in Chapter I, politicization is the effect of analysts or 
intelligence officials injecting their preference for a particular policy outcome into their 
intelligence analysis.384 There could be many reasons to politicize intelligence, ranging 
from an analyst’s career interests to his or her personal preference for a policy outcome, 
or even in response to pressures from policy makers.385 Intelligence politicization can 
also be a top-down endeavor by politicians. As Daniel Byman relays, politics in the 
United States is an exemplary arena for intelligence politicization as “cherry picking and 
the selective use of evidence are inherent in domestic politics and political 
campaigning.”386 Joshua Rovner further argues that, in domestic politics, incentives are 
prevalent for “policymakers to oversell the amount and quality of information on security 
threats” particularly because “intelligence is a uniquely effective public relations vehicle 
[that] carries an aura of secrecy…[P]oliticians can use the intelligence imprimatur to 
invoke the national interest without having to be specific.”387 In other words, because the 
intelligence community controls classified information, the community and its products 
are subject to political pressure and even manipulation by politicians seeking to garner 
support for their policies. 
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While politicization incentives are nothing new, an argument can be made that the 
intelligence community’s vulnerability to politicization has increased since the 1980s.388 
Rovner argues that the “expanding marketplace for information and analysis” available to 
policymakers puts pressure on the intelligence community to “provide the firm and 
unequivocal estimates they need to keep pace with their private sector competitors.”389 
As evidence, Rovner cites the rapid growth of “alternative sources for news and 
commentary” such as cable news, the Internet, and social media who “all compete with 
intelligence agencies for policy attention.”390 Analytical competition has also increased 
as the number of think tanks has nearly doubled since the 1980s, with Rovner listing 
more than 180 studying national security as of 2011, many producing reports rivaling 
official intelligence estimates. Of course, this private analysis explosion also lures away 
quality analysts who are likely to be paid higher salaries in the private sector.391 As a 
result of these factors, Rovner suggests that intelligence officials are more likely to “err 
on the side of boldness,” making them “more willing to overstate the quality of 
potentially dubious data and to draw unequivocal inferences from uncertain information.”  
Of course, as Mark Lowenthal argues, proving politicization is a difficult task and 
“the size or persistence of the politicization problem is difficult to determine.”392 For 
example, some prominent scholars have concluded that, “the Bush administration 
encouraged excessive certainty in analysis, eroding nuances” in order to justify the Iraqi 
invasion based on Iraq’s supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction.393 
However, multiple formal reviews have found that blatant politicization of intelligence 
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estimates did not occur prior to the Iraq War.394 That said, Lowenthal does acknowledge 
that politicization within the intelligence community is possible and that “analysts’ 
careers can rise and fall…as a result of which side of a debate they are on.”395 Certainly, 
as documented by Uri Bar-Joseph, Michael Rubin and others, cases of generally agreed-
upon intelligence politicization are available in American history.396  
In researching this thesis, however, no definitive proof of intelligence 
politicization regarding the terrorism threat post-9/11 appears readily available. That may 
not be unexpected however, given, as Marina Caparini explains, “[post-9/11] there are 
significant grounds for doubting whether legal safeguards and oversight and review 
mechanisms have kept pace with the developing methods and capacities of the 
intelligence community. Furthermore, there has been little debate on some of the 
assumptions and assertions used to justify the [War on Terror].”397 Central to Caparini’s 
argument is that intelligence agencies tend to over-classify information, that is, “engage 
in indiscriminate classification,” and are slow to declassify information. As a result, 
accountability measures, such as oversight by Congress or public debate by watchdog 
groups like the media are difficult to employ.398 Indeed, in 2007, a subcommittee of the 
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House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security investigating the issue noted 
that in 2001, eight million new classification actions occurred compared to 14 million in 
2005. Similarly, in 2001 nearly 100 million documents were declassified compared to 
only 29 million in 2005. Additionally, 28 “pseudo-classification” policies existed at the 
time of the hearing for the protection of “sensitive but unclassified” information. 
Subcommittee chair, Representative Jane Harmon, concluded that “a recurrent theme 
throughout the 9/11 Commission’s report was the need to prevent widespread over-
classification by the federal government…The numbers tell us we are still not heeding 
the commission’s warning.”399 Thus, the unclassified nature of this thesis is a limitation 
in regard to definitively identifying intelligence politicization as a factor in elevating the 
public’s perception of the terrorist threat; however, there does appear to be incentive and 
precedent for politicization regarding security threats.  
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter argues that all told, considering the institutional factors affecting the 
terrorism industry, it is definitely possible, if not likely, that members of the industry 
aligned themselves in support of the justifications for the War on Terror for their own 
benefit. Political elites gained agenda and electoral support, bureaucrats advanced their 
organizations or their own careers, state and local entities won grants, and commercial 
industry and individuals made money. Discounting malicious intent, the industry as a 
whole contributed to elevating and sustaining Americans’ perception of the terrorist 
threat beyond what it might otherwise have done had the War on Terror not been 
declared post-9/11. As Lustick surmises, “The mechanisms that power this whirlwind are 
not under the control of any group or collection of individuals…this imperative justified 
the attitude of emergency and defined the situation as a nation mobilizing for war. 
Opportunities were thereupon created for every group, every company, every sector of 
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society, and every lobbyist to advance its product or preference as crucially important for 
success in the War on Terror.”  
The next, and final, chapter will discuss the implications of the previous two 
chapters, offering suggestions for how best to counter Americans’ inflated perception of 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has demonstrated that Americans’ fear of the terrorist threat increased 
significantly and remained elevated during the decade after 9/11. Before 9/11, terrorist 
attacks in the United States provoked public fear that receded relatively quickly after the 
attack. After 9/11, however, the public responded to the attack and public fear levels 
did not return to pre-9/11 levels as one might expect. Several factors influenced that 
shift. First, the news media landscape shifted dramatically due to structural factors such 
as increased competition for audience share among traditional news sources, cable news 
networks, and the Internet. A shifting emphasis from hard to soft news and news as 
public drama ensued, resulting in the media over-reporting terrorism-related content 
while allowing political elites to set the public agenda and flaunt the terrorist threat to 
their advantage. Second, the Internet allowed terrorist organizations, especially Al Qaeda 
and its affiliates, to directly propagate threats and messages to the public, thus bypassing 
traditional media gatekeepers and creating the illusion of a more widely distributed and 
capable terrorist threat. Third, popular culture, especially film and television drama, 
affected Americans’ stereotypical understanding of terrorism by only superficially 
representing the threat. Film began framing terrorists as fiendish, vicious, and prolific 
well before 9/11 and television sustained and amplified depictions of the threat well 
beyond 9/11. Finally, politicians and members of the terrorism industry were incentivized 
after 9/11 to inflate concerns about the terrorism threat: political elites used the threat to 
garner support for policies or for electoral purposes, bureaucrats advanced their 
organizations or their own careers, state and local entities won grants, and commercial 
industry and individuals made financial gains. 
However, these factors did not affect Americans’ perceptions of terrorism 
independently. Rather, the factors coalesced, influencing each other to inflate Americans’ 
fear. Furthermore, innate human psychological and sociological characteristics amplified 
Americans’ reactions to these factors. Given this combination, Americans suffered a 
prolonged collective psychosis, or culture of fear, regarding their perceptions of the 
terrorist threat, initiated by 9/11, and sustained by the above-outlined factors. The 
 100
National Institute of Health explains that “psychosis” is used to “describe conditions of 
the mind where there has been some loss of contact with reality.”400 This thesis therefore 
uses collective psychosis to describe the apparent shift in the public’s fear about the post-
9/11 terrorist threat despite the lack any significant change in the scale and intensity of 
the terrorist threat within the United States. The remainder of this chapter expands on this 
notion and closes with recommendations to potentially counter that psychosis. 
A. CREATING AND SUSTAINING A COLLECTIVE PSYCHOSIS 
The development of each of the major factors explored in this thesis partly 
explains Americans’ shifting perceptions of the terrorist threat before and after 9/11. 
However, this thesis argues that the interdependence of these factors is critical to 
understanding the dramatic extent to which Americans’ fear of terrorism changed and 
was sustained over time. Moreover, ordinary human psychological and sociological 
tendencies in reaction to 9/11 amplified the effect. An expanded explanation of the 
interdependence of factors and the psychological and sociological phenomena working to 
create and sustain that collective psychosis follows. 
The factors described in this thesis operated both individually and in concert to 
affect Americans’ perception of the terrorist threat. For example, terrorist organizations 
took advantage of the Internet to directly propagate their threats through social media, 
thereby bypassing traditional media gatekeepers. However, because of the news media’s 
shift towards soft news, infotainment, and public drama, news outlets also rebroadcast 
terrorists’ latest threats and propaganda from the Internet onto mainstream media 
platforms. In turn, political elites reacted to the continuously propagated terrorist threat, 
likely using the threat to bolster their position and policies. The news media in turn 
broadcast these political messages, often failing to uphold the media’s watchdog role. 
Indeed, many of the analysts and experts the news media relied on were members of the 
terrorism industry themselves, coming from think tanks and government bureaucracies 
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with a vested interest in inflating the terrorist threat. Simultaneously, popular culture, 
especially television drama, reflected these themes in its programming, some of which 
then made its way back into the political discourse. As the previous chapter pointed out, 
even national political elites felt compelled to reference fictional characters, such as Jack 
Bauer from television’s 24, when they needed to defend a particular position. 
When combined with innate human psychological and sociological characteristics 
described in Chapter I, it is unsurprising that the public’s perceptions of the terrorist 
threat shifted in response to the factors described in this thesis evolving during the 1990s 
and 2000s. For example, given people’s natural tendency to rally around the President 
and take greater interest in the news after a crisis, it follows that the public would be 
highly responsive to the Bush administration’s framing of 9/11 as an act of war. 
Moreover, people’s inherent cognitive biases, such as overestimating the probability of 
events when they can picture similar events that are recent, memorable, and receive great 
publicity, make it unlikely that they would question the assumption that 9/11 “changed 
everything.” This is especially true since evidence to the contrary was not forthcoming 
from either the news media, politicians, or government officials. (see Figure 17). 
Figure 17.  Post-9/11 Public Collective Psychosis Cycle. 
 
 
It appears that 9/11 initiated a collective psychosis within the American public as 
the public initially relied on the news media, political elites, and their own inherent 
understanding of terrorism to make sense of the attack. The public watched 9/11 live on 
television and was bombarded with news about the attacks. The Bush administration 
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quickly framed the attack as an act of war and a struggle of good against evil. This frame 
aligned with Americans’ concepts of terrorism as depicted in popular culture. 
Furthermore, opposition voices were nearly silent, or at least not represented in news 
media. This sequence heralded the War on Terror, which led to the creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and significant 
financial, political, and bureaucratic incentives for political elites and the terrorism 
industry to continuously propagate the terrorist threat both to the public and within the 
government itself. Concurrently, terrorists themselves mastered mass self-communication 
through the Internet, issuing propaganda and threats that would be both accessible by an 
increasingly tech-savvy public and rebroadcast by traditional news media desperately 
competing for audience share. In addition, popular culture depictions of terrorism 
mimicked the War on Terror frame, superficially depicting terrorists as fanatical, evil and 
bent on destroying the United States. In reaction, Americans’ perception of the terrorist 
threat divorced itself from reality. This cycle of collective psychosis sustained itself for 
years after 9/11 as large numbers of Americans feared becoming the victims of terrorism 
despite the lack of any significant increase in the scale and intensity of the threat 
compared to before 9/11. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In December 2015, Gallup polls showed that 51 percent of Americans were either 
very or somewhat worried about becoming victims of terrorism.401 This is the highest 
since immediately after 9/11 and represents a steady climb since 2011. Furthermore, 
55 percent of poll respondents in 2016 said they were dissatisfied with security from 
terrorism, up from just 27 percent in 2014.402 Recent attempts to cut counterterrorism 
funding from the 2017 Department of Homeland Security budget by President Donald 
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Trump faced significant political backlash.403 Clearly, Americans’ perception about the 
terrorist threat remains a relevant topic. This section therefore briefly offers 
recommendations for countering the American public’s inflated fears about the threat of 
terrorism.  
1. Risk Communication 
One promising area of research regarding the public’s reaction to terrorism is risk 
communication. William J. Burns explains that risk communication is essentially “talking 
about risks in a way that promotes understanding and that dispels fear.”404 Key to this 
effort is targeting gaps in public knowledge and enhancing risk communicators’ ability to 
effectively interface with the public.405 For example, Burns’ research suggests that so-
called “risk domain experts” should be well versed in risk-related information, such as 
“probabilities, consequences, causal mechanisms, and possible mitigation strategies.”406 
Furthermore, Burns argues that the public responds best to risk communication efforts 
when communicators have deeply established lines of communication and trust with the 
public.407 
Of course, as Priscilla Lewis outlines, because of the power of fear to influence 
people’s thinking and the many incentives and other factors driving wide-spread public 
fear of terrorism, “promoting a more constructive public conversation about terrorism and 
responses to terrorism is one of the toughest communications challenges facing 
responsible opinion leaders today.”408 That said, Lewis argues that some frames and 
                                                 
403 Mark Berman, “Trump’s Dept. of Homeland Security Budget Would Dramatically Cut 
Counterterrorism Programs, Report Says,” Washington Post, July 13, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/07/13/trumps-dhs-budget-would- 
dramatically-cut-counterterrorism-program-report-says/?utm_term=.2d8567b21c2a. 
404 William J. Burns, “Communicating About Threat,” in Terrorizing Ourselves (see note 279), 245. 
405 Ibid., 250–252. Example of risk communicators include public officials, first responders, and 
community leaders. 
406 Ibid., 250. 
407 Ibid., 251. 
408 Priscilla Lewis, “The Impact of Fear on Public Thinking about Counterterrorism Policy,” in 
Terrorizing Ourselves (see note 279), 221–222. 
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themes, when properly employed, have been shown to have a calming effect on public 
fears. Specifically, Lewis notes that messages crafted to explain that “when we overreact 
to terrorism, we hurt ourselves” have a measurable impact at both the individual and 
collective levels.409 The public appears to relate to this type of message, which, as Lewis 
explains, “can calm fears without sounding as if it counsels inaction.”410 Furthermore, the 
message apparently engages people intellectually rather than emotionally, therefore 
activating the audience’s “critical faculties.”411 Ultimately, Lewis concludes that 
effective messaging should be “easy to think,” be concrete and actionable rather than 
abstract, calm fears and “[reduce] submissiveness to authority,” and suggest a better 
response rather than “simply negate unhelpful responses.”412 
More research is called for in regard to effective risk communication and the 
public’s reaction to the terrorist threat. Aligning effective narratives with appropriate 
responses to the terrorist threat appears key to easing Americans’ overreaction to the 
terrorist threat. Perhaps a cross-case study comparing the United States with certain 
European countries could yield some insight. For instance, despite recent experiences 
with terrorism in the United Kingdom, 69 percent of those polled in 2016 said their 
chances of being personally affected by terrorism were low or non-existent.413 
Furthermore, efforts should be made to not only understand the public’s knowledge gaps 
regarding terrorism, but also how these gaps are formed to begin with. Research should 
also consider how cognitive processes are affected by those knowledge gaps. 
Additionally, understanding how and why so-called “fear mongers” exploit those 
knowledge gaps is critical to understanding how risk communicators can counter that 
                                                 
409 Ibid., 226. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid., 227. 
412 Ibid., 228. 
413 Matthew Smith, “Terrorist Attack in Britain Expected by 84% of People,” YouGov, August 4th, 
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exploitation. Future research should be done with full consideration of the various 
incentives or disincentives affecting risk communicators, especially the media, political 
elites, and members of the terrorism industry. Taken together, targeted and contextualized 
risk communication should be studied as a means to both counter fear-based messaging 
and drive critically considered public reactions to terrorism. 
2. Counterterrorism Economics 
Another promising area of research is the economics of counterterrorism. 
Veronique de Rugy, for example, argues that policymakers should focus “more on how 
the political process distorts spending decisions.”414 De Rugy takes the position that 
applying an economics perspective to homeland security spending can overcome public 
choice failures. She argues that using sound cost-benefit analysis and other risk 
management techniques can overcome political elites’ and the terrorism industry’s 
incentives to inflate fear.415 De Rugy explains that, “efficient expenditures concentrate 
limited resources on the most cost-effective measures rather than simply on the effective 
ones.”416 For example, the cost of installing hijacker-proof cockpit doors in airliners is 
both cheaper and more effective than either the federal air marshals program or airline 
baggage screening programs.417 In other words, “more security spending does not always 
mean more security.”418 Furthermore, de Rugy suggests that, because homeland security 
is a mix of public and private goods, policymakers should consider the appropriate level 
for homeland security spending. Spending that benefits the entire country, such as 
intelligence gathering and border security, should be done federally and spending that 
                                                 
414 Veronique de Rugy, “The Economics of Homeland Security,” in Terrorizing Ourselves (see note 
279), 121. 
415 Ibid., 128–129. 
416 Ibid., 127. 
417 Ibid., 127–128. De Rugy notes that the cost to retrofit cockpit barrier doors is between $300–$500 
million over ten years compared to the $7.8 billion spent on TSA’s passenger and baggage screening in 
2010 alone. This contrast is especially stark considering that the program’s primary goal appears to be 
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explosives at the time. Mueller and Stewart also note that federal air marshals cost $966 million in 2012, 
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418 Ibid., 128. 
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benefits a particular state or locality, such as most infrastructure (e.g., bridges and water 
treatment plants), should be done at the state or local level.419 Since, as de Rugy explains, 
states theoretically do not run budget deficits, state and local officials have more 
incentive to consider the costs and benefits of security spending.420 
Similarly, Benjamin Friedman proposes that competition for resources can be an 
effective means to curb counterterrorism overreaction when applied to the Department of 
Homeland Security and other federal agencies. By simultaneously distributing 
counterterrorism missions across agencies whose primary focus is not counterterrorism 
and maintaining a “revenue neutral” or zero-sum approach to spending, Friedman argues 
that bureaucratic competition could diminish incentives to hype the terrorist threat.421 
Likewise, removing the counterterrorism mission and funding from certain entities, 
especially the Department of Defense, could lead to similar results.422 The goal, 
ultimately, is to “create a more functional marketplace of ideas about security dangers 
[within the federal government], thereby improving public threat perception.”423 
Of course, the challenge in implementing any of the above strategies is 
overcoming the incentives that created the situation in the first place. Research should 
focus on effective means of both preventing and overcoming economic incentives 
derived from federal security spending. For instance, research should consider how risk 
communication principles might apply within bureaucratic organizations or how the 
federal regulatory review system could be most effectively applied to counterterrorism 
spending. In any case, understanding how and why federal counterterrorism spending has 
                                                 
419 Ibid., 129–130. De Rugy suggests that purely private property protection should be the 
responsibility of the property owner. See pages 130–131 for a brief discussion about mixed goods, such as 
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420 Ibid., 135. 
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Ourselves (see note 279), 207–208. Friedman argues that dismantling the Department of Homeland 
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grown, and who potentially benefits from it, is essential to understanding how to disrupt 
threat inflation. 
3. Intelligence Transparency 
Enhancing intelligence transparency may also help dissuade threat inflation. 
Daniel Byman, in his recent review work about intelligence community challenges and 
failures, compiles several promising solutions. First, he recommends that intelligence 
products should include alternative hypothesis and “make their methods more 
explicit.”424 Second, the intelligence community should engage in “competitive analysis” 
and an “adversarial approach” that can highlight the range of a debate.425 Third, analysts 
should convey uncertainty and fully explain “confidence levels.”426 Finally, Byman 
relays that an external, blind, and critical peer review could be an ideal process to 
“identify flaws and weaknesses” in analysis, much as academics do.427 By 
institutionalizing these policies, political elites and the terrorism industry may be less 
able to uncritically inflate terrorist threats. Additionally, the intelligence community may 
be less likely to engage in politicization or even unconscious bias in its analysis.   
Furthermore, Claudia Hillebrand argues that the news media can enhance 
intelligence transparency. For instance, the news media can transmit intelligence 
information to the public, be an intelligence community “substitute watchdog,” and be a 
legitimizing institution for intelligence.428 In the first case, engaged news media can 
“contribute to, or trigger, a public debate on the content, objectives and limits of 
intelligence work more broadly.”429 Members of the intelligence community can also use 
                                                 
424 Daniel Byman, “Intelligence and Its Critics,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism no. 39, 3 (2016): 
272. 
425 Ibid., 272–273. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid., 273. 
428 Claudia Hillebrand, “The Role of News Media in Intelligence Oversight,” Intelligence and 
National Security 27, no. 5 (2012): 705. 
429 Ibid., 696; Hillebrand notes that most commonly, the media’s role is to bring government 
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the news media to potentially rouse formal oversight bodies as well as to help propagate 
official reports in more accessible formats.430 Lastly, the intelligence community can 
foster legitimacy through the news media by “demonstrating that intelligence 
performance is overseen…independently” and by ensuring reporting of successful 
operations.431 In essence, a synergistic relationship between the media and the 
intelligence community may help drive public discourse about the adequacy and 
necessity of counterterrorism programs and spending. This, in turn, could serve to better 
inform Americans about the terrorist threat while curbing incentives to inflate the threat. 
Further research is warranted regarding how liberal democracies can and should 
balance the need for intelligence transparency and security. Again, as in the previous 
recommendations, this research should take into consideration the various incentives 
affecting the intelligence community and the consumers and users of counterterrorism 
intelligence. The research should also be multi-disciplinary, such as considering the 
above-mentioned aspects of risk communication with an economic perspective. Lastly, 
media studies should further consider the interdependencies between the intelligence 
community, mass media, including popular culture and the Internet, and public threat 
perception. 
C. CLOSING REMARKS 
This thesis has argued that Americans’ perceptions of the terrorist threat have not 
remained proportional to the scale and intensity of terrorism in the United States post-
9/11 compared to pre-9/11. That is not to say that terrorism is a non-existent threat, to 
dismiss the suffering of victims of terrorism, or to discount the valiant efforts of those 
involved in counterterrorism. Rather, the point is that Americans’ reaction to terrorism 
post-9/11 was affected by factors beyond the actual scale and intensity of threat. 
Moreover, as a result of that reaction, the American public was willing to make 
                                                 
430 Ibid., 698; Hillebrand notes that “leaking” is the most common form of the intelligence 
community interfacing with the media to spur public debate and formal oversight review. See pages 697–
698. 
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significant sacrifices, in terms of blood, treasure, and civil liberties, in the name of 
security. This thesis aims to illuminate that shift and some of its underlying causes so that 
Americans can better understand the forces that affected their perceptions of the terrorist 
threat. This thesis makes no judgement about the policies the American public supported, 
but it does strive to ensure that Americans, in at least some small way, make future 
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